The Judicial Admissions Exception to the Statute of Frauds: A Curiously Gradual Adoption by Barnes, Wayne
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
12-2020 
The Judicial Admissions Exception to the Statute of Frauds: A 
Curiously Gradual Adoption 
Wayne Barnes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
THE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS EXCEPTION TO THE
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Wayne R. Barnes*
The statute of frauds requires certain categories of
contracts to be evidenced by a signed writing. The original
purpose of the statute of frauds, indeed its titular purpose, is
the prevention of the fraudulent assertion of a non-existent
oral contract. Although a signed writing is the formal way in
which to satisfy the statute of frauds, courts have long
recognized various exceptions to the writing requirement
which will be held to satisfy the statute absent a writing. The
effect of such exceptions is that they constitute an alternative
form of evidence for the presence of a contract. One such
exception is the judicial admission of a contract - where the
defendant admits in his pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in
court under oath that a contract (and its terms) exists. Such
judicial admission of the existence of a contract seemingly
completely vindicates the primary and original purpose of the
statute of frauds. A defendant hat judicially admits that he
or she entered into a contract, has no concern that such
contract is fraudulently being asserted against him. It is,
therefore, "astonishing" (to use Professor Robert Stevens's
phrase) that the judicial admissions exception completely fell
out of favor in England, and then the United States in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and instead the
dominant majority rule became the elimination of the
exception. For the stated purposes of removing the defendant's
incentive to commit perjury and falsely deny the contract in
order to avoid liability, the now longstanding majority rule
became that a defendant could admit the contract and yet still
assert the statute of frauds defense. Such a rule is of dubious
justification, which is why Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code reinstated the judicial admissions
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exception in the case of contracts for the sale of goods. The rule
remained virtually absent in non-goods cases, however.
Thankfully, and as reported by Professor Shedd in published
articles in 1984 and 1991, an embryonic judicial admissions
rule began to reemerge in the early twentieth century, but he
observed that it remained a very small minority rule. This
article updates the research to the present and observes that
the rule appears to still be a minority rule although the
number of adoptions has increased. Nevertheless, the rule
represents ound statute of frauds policy, and should be fully
implemented by case decision or statute.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The statute of frauds ("the statute") has been part of the law of
contracts for over three centuries.1 The statute's requirement for
certain categories of contracts to be in writing and signed by the party
to be charged has several claimed purposes.2 Paramount among those
purposes is the prevention of fraudulent claims of the existence of an
oral contract, when in fact none has been entered into. Indeed, the
original title of the English statute enacted in 1677 was "An Act for
the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries."3 The statute's ultimate aim,
therefore, is to prevent fraudulent claims that a contract exists when
it does not.4 Stated another way, the statute of frauds is concerned
with false claims that a contract has been formed. Conversely, when
satisfactory evidence otherwise exists that a contract was formed
between the parties, most courts have found that the underlying
1. Strictly speaking, of course, there is no single "statute of frauds" in the
United States. Nor is the statute generally a matter of the common law of the
jurisdiction. See 4 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 12.4 (2019) ("All
treatises on the law of contracts deal with the statute of frauds, almost as if it
were a part of the common law of the land; yet it is not a part of the common law
in the same sense as are the doctrine of consideration and the rules as to mutual
assent. Court decisions of one state are regularly cited as authority in the courts
of other states; yet the statutes that are being interpreted and applied may have
substantial differences. Accuracy always requires a knowledge of the specific
statute in every case that is cited as authority. There is not one statute of frauds;
there are many statutes of frauds.").
2. 9 RICHARD LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 21:1 (4th ed. 2011) ("The
statute of frauds was designed to prevent the enforcement of unfounded
fraudulent claims by requiring written evidence. Alternatively, as it is
sometimes expressed, the statute was enacted to prevent fraud by requiring
certain enumerated contracts to be evidenced in writing. It has also been
recognized, however, that the statute ensures that the parties will act with
deliberation and not improvidently, suggesting not only an evidentiary but also
cautionary and channeling functions.") (citations omitted).
3. Id. (citing C.R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc., 600 A.2d 772, 775
(1991)). The Connecticut Supreme Court, commenting on the statute, observed:
The Connecticut statute of frauds has its origins in a 1677 English
statute entitled 'An Act for the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries.' The
statute appears to have been enacted in response to developments in
the common law arising out of the advent of the writ of assumpsit,
which changed the general rule precluding enforcement of oral
promises in the King's courts. Thereafter, perjury and the subornation
of perjury became a widespread and serious problem. Furthermore,
because juries at that time decided cases on their own personal
knowledge of the facts, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial,
a requirement, in specified transactions, of 'some memorandum or
note ... in writing, and signed by the party to be charged' placed a
limitation on the uncontrolled discretion of the jury . . .. Although the
British Parliament repealed most provisions of the statute, including
the one-year provision, in 1954 . .. the statute nonetheless remains the
law virtually everywhere in the United States.
C.R. Klewin, 600 A.2d at 775.
4. LORD, supra note 2.
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policy concerns of the statute have been satisfied, and the contract
should be enforced in spite of the lack of a formal, signed writing.5
Hence, certain exceptions to the statute's formal writing
requirements have developed over the years, including notably the
part-performance exception for land sale contracts,6 the full
performance exception for contracts not performable within one year,7
and the "main purpose" exception to the guaranty statute of frauds.8
To say nothing of the innovations of the statute of frauds provision of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), including a
goods-based part-performance rule,9 the merchant's confirmation
rule,10 and the specially manufactured goods rule.1 In all these
instances, courts are authorized to find an enforceable contract, in
spite of the lack of a formal, signed writing, because of other evidence
that provides a strong suggestion of the existence of a contract. Such
other evidence-when established-dispenses with the need for a
formal, signed writing, and the danger of fraud in assertion of the
contract is largely eliminated by the presence of such other
alternative evidence.
5. See, e.g., C.R. Kewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc., 936 F.2d 684, 686 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Statute of Frauds only invalidates oral contracts of an express
definite duration in excess of one year.").
6. 10 RICHARD LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRAcTS § 28:3 (4th ed. 2011) (citing
Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U.S. 171, 184 (1895)) ("From an early day, courts
of equity have excepted from the operation of the Statute of Frauds contracts for
the sale of land when there has been part performance of the contract.").
7. Id. § 28:9 ("Except in contracts for the sale of land, an agreement not
performable within a year is generally not validated by part performance
although performance of one entire side of the contract or of a divisible portion of
it is often held to make the Statute inapplicable.") (citations omitted).
8. Id. § 22:20 ("Where the leading purpose of a person who agrees to pay the
debt of another is to gain some advantage, or promote some interest or purpose
of his own, and not to become a mere guarantor or surety of another's debt, and
the promise is made on a sufficient consideration, it will be valid although not in
writing.") (citations omitted).
9. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977) ("A
contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable . .. with respect to goods for which payment
has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted.").
10. Id. § 2-201(2) ("Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing
in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and
the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the
requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of
objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.").
11. Id. § 2-201(3)(a) ("A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable . . . if the goods
are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, before notice
of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate
that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their
manufacture or commitments for their procurement.").
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One other type of evidence that a contract exists is a simple
admission of its existence by the parties.12 And, when the admission
is in the context of a judicial proceeding-a so-called "judicial
admission"-the evidence of the existence of a contract is quite strong
indeed.13 In fact, the entire original concern of the statute of frauds-
that someone would falsely and fraudulently claim that a contract
had been formed when it had not-is completely eliminated if the one
against whom the contract is asserted admits in a court proceeding
that the contract is indeed legitimate and was entered into between
the parties.14 As one court noted:
Under existing procedure, the purpose of the Statute
of Frauds is to protect a party . .. from perjured
evidence against him. The purpose of evidence is to
prove facts. Admissions of a party in testifying, though
in form evidence, are in essence not mere evidence, but
make evidence against him unnecessary.
15
Therefore, a defendant's admission of the existence of the
contract should clearly remove the statute of frauds as a defense in
the action. No fraud is present in the assertion of the contract, since
it admittedly exists just as the proponent claims. So, there is no
"fraud" being perpetrated, as originally feared and targeted by the
statute of frauds. In fact, it is well known that the statute of frauds
provision of Article 2 of the U.C.C. (applicable to transactions in
goods) does exactly that.16 It provides in section 2-201(3)(b) that
12. Id. § 2-201(3)(b) ("[I]f the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale
was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the
quantity of goods admitted.").
13. See, e.g., Gibson v. Arnold, 288 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2002) (referring
to U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) as the "judicial admission exception").
14. See, e.g., Zlotziver v. Zlotziver, 49 A.2d 779, 781 (Pa. 1946) ("The statute
of frauds, however, does not absolutely invalidate an oral contract relating to land
but is intended merely to guard against perjury on the part of one claiming under
the alleged agreement. Accordingly, if the title holder admits, either in his
pleadings or his testimony, that he did in fact enter into the contract, the purpose
of the statute of frauds is served and the oral agreement will be enforced by the
court.").
15. Trossbach v. Trossbach, 42 A.2d 905, 908 (Md. 1945).
16. U.C.C. § 2-102. It is commonplace for commentators and courts to state
that Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to contracts for the "sale of goods." See Crystal
L. Miller, Note, Goods/Services Dichotomy and the U.C.C.: Unweaving the
Tangled Web, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717, 718 (1984). However, technically
speaking, Article 2 applies to all "transactions in goods." U.C.C. § 2-102.
Notwithstanding the technically broader scope of applicability, the cases decided
under Article 2, as well as many of its provisions, are primarily concerned with
contracts for the sale of goods. See 1 HAWKLAND U.C.C. SERIES § 2-102:2 (2019),
Transactions in Goods ("Two requirements must be met in order for Article 2 to
apply: there must be a 'transaction' and the transaction must be 'in goods.' The
term 'transaction' is undefined, but generally includes a sale. The title of Article
2 is 'Sales' and many of the provisions of Article 2 are geared toward a buyer or a
seller. A 'sale' is defined in Section 2-106(1) as the passing of title from a seller
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[a] contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) [writing signed by party to be charged] but which
is valid in other respects is enforceable . .. if the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony
or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the
contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the
quantity of goods admitted.17
But Article 2 of the U.C.C. only applies to transactions in goods.18
What about all other types of contracts besides those concerning
goods (real estate, services, employment, construction, etc.)? Is there
a judicial admissions exception analog outside the applicability of the
U.C.C.? The current answer, and the history of the path to that
answer, is one that is somewhat surprising. The brief answer, which
will be discussed in more detail in the Parts that follow, is that such
an exception did arise shortly after the promulgation of the original
English statute in 1677, but then fell out of favor throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.19 In the middle of the twentieth
century, and in fact late into the 1980s and beyond, it remained the
dominant majority rule in the United States that there was no
effective judicial admissions exception outside the U.C.C.20
Therefore, a party was entitled to judicially admit that a contract was
formed between the parties, and yet still interpose the statute of
frauds as a defense to avoid obligation under the contract.21 An early
law review article on the issue, written in 1951 by Professor Robert
S. Stevens, noted that three early exceptions to the statute of frauds'
applicability arose in the immediate aftermath of its passage, such
that a defendant was not allowed to utilize the defense: "a) where his
own fraud was responsible for the non-existence of the required
signed memorandum, b) under the equitable doctrine of part
performance, and c) where the defendant admits the contract."22
After observing that the judicial admission exception fell out of favor
and was eliminated throughout the United States as an exception to
the statute's applicability, Stevens observed that it was "astonishing"
that it should have failed to persevere as an exception to the statute,
to a buyer for a price. [However, t]he scope of Article 2 is in fact broader than
sale of goods transactions[, including] . . . option contracts, distributorship or
exclusive dealing agreements, and franchise agreements.") (citations omitted).
17. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
18. Id. § 2-102.
19. MURRAY, supra note 1, § 14.2.
20. See Peter J. Shedd, Statute of Frauds: Judicial Admission Exception -
Where Has It Gone? Is It Coming Back?, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 5 (1984).
21. See Robert S. Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.
Q. 355, 356 (1952) (citing BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS § 515 (5th ed. 1895); 2
REED, STATUTE OF FRAUDS §§ 526, 537 (1884)) ("But by the unbroken course of
more modern decisions, it is now well settled that although the defendant admits
the agreement, it cannot be enforced without the production of a written
memorandum, if he insist upon the bar of the statute.").
22. Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
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given its probative value towards establishing the genuineness of the
contract at issue.23 Such was the state of the law of the statute of
frauds in 1951 when Professor Stevens wrote his article, noting the
ethical dilemma faced by lawyers and litigants who admit a contract
was entered into, but nevertheless chose to assert the statute of
frauds in order to escape liability. 24
In 1984, Professor Peter Shedd wrote an article that looked at the
state of the judicial admissions exception outside of the U.C.C. to that
point.25 In the article, Professor Shedd noted (as had Professor
Stevens) that the dominant majority rule in the United States at that
time was that a litigant could admit that he had entered into a
contract, and yet still assert the statute of frauds as a defense in the
event that there was no signed, written memorialization of the
agreement.26 That is, effectively, the dominant majority rule in the
United States as of 1984 was that there was no judicial admissions
exception that would take the contract out of the non-U.C.C. statute
of frauds.27 Shedd documented a small number of states that had
apparently adopted the judicial admissions exception anew as a revolt
from the majority rule. In all, as of 1984, Shedd reported that eight
states (plus the District of Columbia) had recognized and adopted the
judicial admissions exception to the non-U.C.C. statute of frauds.
28
These adoptions had been decided, both judicially and in some
instances by statute, throughout the decades of the twentieth century
through the 1970s. In two follow-up articles in 1991, Professor Shedd
updated his research, and found that two more states had adopted
the judicial admissions exception under their respectively applicable
non-U.C.C. statutes of fraud, through approximately that date.
29
23. Id. at 381.
24. Id. at 378.
25. Shedd, supra note 20.
26. Id. at 4-5.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 26-27; see also Peter J. Shedd, The Judicial Admissions Exception
to the Statute of Frauds: An Update, 12 WHITTIER L. REv. 131, 140 (1991) (app. I).
Shedd reported that a ninth state, Illinois, had upheld an agreement made and
announced in open court, as enforceable without a separate, signed writing, as
against a statute of frauds challenge. See Shedd, supra note 25, at 23-24 (citing
Kalman v. Bertacchi, 373 N.E.2d 550, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 80/2 (West 2016); Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1212
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
29. See Shedd, supra note 28. Shedd reported that a third state,
Massachusetts, had upheld an agreement made and announced in open court, as
enforceable without a separate, signed writing, as against a statute of frauds
challenge. Id. at 134 (citing Dominick v. Dominick, 463 N.E.2d 564, 568 n.2
(Mass. App. Ct. 1984)). Professor Shedd published a second article in 1991 which
appears to contain his findings from his 1991 Whittier Law Review article,
presented in condensed form. See Peter J. Shedd, The Admissions Exception to
the Statute of Frauds in Real Estate Transactions, 19 REAL EsT. L.J. 232, 232-33
(1991).
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Accordingly, as of 1991, Professor Shedd reported that in total
ten states (plus the District of Columbia) had adopted the judicial
admissions exception in the context of the non-U.C.C. statute of
frauds, with two more states holding to the more limited position of
enforcing oral agreements made in open court.30 Professor Shedd
believed the judicial admissions exception made good, pragmatic legal
sense, and hoped to see it become the majority rule in the United
States, to match the similar rule provided by the U.C.C.31 While he
was heartened by the seemingly steady adoption of the judicial
admissions exception through the 1970s, as reported in his 1984
article,32 he was discouraged by what he saw as a reduced pace of
adoption through the period reported in his follow-up 1991 articles.33
The purpose of this Article is to update Professor Shedd's
research on the adoption and recognition of the judicial admissions
exception to the non-U.C.C. statute of frauds. Like Professor Shedd,
this Article posits that the rule makes good legal sense, since one who
is willing to judicially admit that he entered into the contract has no
fear or danger of being defrauded by a false allegation that he made
the agreement. The prevention of such fraud being the
overwhelmingly dominant (and indeed titular) purpose to be served
by the formal writing requirement of the statute of frauds, no
compelling reason exists to deny the enforcement of the contract once
such a judicial admission has been made. Part II of this Article will
briefly chronicle the enactment of the statute of frauds, its underlying
policy goals, and the exceptions which have developed. Part III will
discuss the rise and fall of the judicial admissions exception
specifically in the United States. Part IV will briefly discuss and
summarize the findings of Professor Shedd's articles regarding the
adoption of the judicial admissions exception through the 1980s. Part
V will update the research on the state of the judicial admissions
exception through the present, and whether the exception has
attained majority status in the United States. Part VI will offer policy
justifications for the judicial admissions exception and urge its
30. Shedd, supra note 28, at 140-41 (apps. I and II).
31. Shedd, supra note 2025, at 33 ("The purpose and conclusion of this article
is to encourage all jurisdictions to adopt the judicial admissions exception at least
in the situation when an admission clearly is made.").
32. Id. at 27 ("The judicial decisions examined indicated there is a strong and
rapidly growing-albeit still small-number of jurisdictions that may someday
result in the judicial admission exception to the statute of frauds to be the
position accepted by the majority of states. Such a trend clearly seems to have
started.").
33. Shedd, supra note 28, at 138-39 ("An update concerning the cases
involving the judicial admissions exception to the statute of frauds causes
speculation about the existence of a 'growing' minority of jurisdictions
recognizing the exception. While Appendix I seems to reveal a quickening pace
of recognition during the latter part of the 1970s and into 1980, Appendix II
shows that this pace has slowed considerably during the 1980s.").
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adoption in the remaining jurisdictions. Part VII will briefly
conclude.
II. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, POLICIES, AND EXCEPTIONS
Oral promises were not originally enforceable in the English
King's courts, but they eventually became enforceable through the
historical expansion of the writ of assumpsit.
34 Once oral promises
were enforceable, perjury became rampant as litigants were enabled
to make false claims that oral contracts had been entered into.
35
Partially in response to this development, in 1677 the English
Parliament enacted an "Act for the Prevention of Fraud and
Perjuries."36 The Act applied to several areas of law, but only two
sections dealt with writing requirements specifically for contracts.
37
One of those sections, Section 4 of the Act, provided as follows:
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted .... That ... no action shall
be brought [(1)] whereby to charge any executor or
administrator upon any special promise, to answer damages out
of his own estate; (2) or whereby to charge the defendant upon
any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another person; (3) or to charge any person upon
any arrangement made upon consideration of marriage; (4) or
upon any contract [f]or sale of lands, tenements or
hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; (5) or
upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the
space of one year from the making thereof; (6) unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by
the party to be charged therewith, or some other person
thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
38
34. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 19.1
(4th ed. 1998).
35. Id. (citing 6 W.S. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 379-97
(1927)).
36. Id. (citing Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2 c. 3 (1677) (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Cha2/29/3).
37. Id. (citing Philip Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposes of the Statute
of Frauds, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 354, 374-78 (1983)) ("This Statute contained
twenty-five sections which dealt with conveyances, wills, trusts, judgments and
executions in addition to contracts.").
38. Id. The 1677 Act also included Section 17, which required all contracts
for the sale of goods for the price of ten pounds or more, to be in writing and
signed. Id. This provision, of course, has its current day American counterpart
in section 2-201 of the U.C.C. (requiring all contracts for the sale of goods of $500
or more to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged). U.C.C. § 2-201(1)
(AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1977).
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These categories of contracts were somewhat arbitrary,39 but
nevertheless the 1677 categories have tended to be adopted by most
American jurisdictions.40
The obvious and predominant purpose of the English Parliament
in enacting the original statute of frauds was, as the title of the Act
suggests, to prevent fraudulent and perjured claims that a contract
exists.41 As Professor Stevens stated in his seminal 1951 article:
"Undeniably, the purpose of the statute was to give assured protection
against the risk, which existence had shown to be real, of convincing
proof through perjured testimony of an agreement hat had never
actually been entered into."42 The Act was deemed necessary, given
that perjured claims had increased in the advent of England's new
allowance of the enforcement of oral promises and agreements.43
The ultimate goal to be achieved by the statute of frauds is to
ensure that judicial enforcement is limited to those agreements that
are actually and honestly entered into, and to screen out false
allegations that contracts were formed. An agreement legitimately
proven is therefore seen as worthy of enforcement. The statute is thus
a means to an end-to ensure that contracts were legitimately formed
before allowing the coercive power of the state to be accessed for their
enforcement.
Although the avoidance of fraud and perjury is the paramount
policy basis for the statute of frauds, other policies are arguably
served by the statute's writing requirement.4 4 Other goals include
certainty, as well as a channeling/deliberative function.45 As
Professors John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo observe in their
treatise: "An agreement reduced to writing promotes certainty; false
testimony stems from faulty recollection as well as from faulty
morals. In addition, the required formality of a writing 'promotes
deliberation, seriousness ... and shows that the act was a genuine
39. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1 ("The kinds of transactions
selected to be put in writing do not seem to constitute a rational catalog of
transactions which ought to be singled out for formalization.").
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 cmt. A (AM. LAW INST.
1981); see, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (West 2005) (Texas version
of the statute of frauds, codifying the same categories as Section 4 of the original
Act). Of note, in 1954 the English parliament repealed all categories except for
land and suretyship contracts. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1
(citing 2 & 3 Eliz. 2 c. 34 (Eng.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/2-
3/34/contents/enacted).
41. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1 ("While the writing
requirement is imposed in large part to obviate perjury, it is clear that other
policy bases for the requirement exist.").
42. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 360.
43. See id. at 380-81.
44. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1.
45. Id.
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act of volition."'46 These are all desirable aims, although it has been
observed that adhering strictly to a formal writing requirement for its
own sake can have the undesirable effect of excluding legitimately
made oral agreements and frustrating the expectations of performing
parties.47
After the adoption of the statute of frauds, both in England and
eventually in the United States, courts developed exceptions to the
statute's formal writing requirement in various instances in which it
was very likely that a contract had been entered into between the
parties.48  One of the earliest such exceptions was the part-
performance exception to the real estate provision of the statute of
frauds.49 This exception was originally decreed by the English courts,
making the statute of frauds inapplicable once the buyer of land had
taken possession.50 The rationale was that the contract was already
considered to be executed at that point.
5 1 Eventually, the courts
required more than mere possession alone, with most jurisdictions
now requiring possession coupled with either some payment of the
price, or the buyer's making of improvements on the land with the
seller's consent.5 2 The point of the part-performance evidence is
plain: "[T]he conduct must convincingly evidence the existence of the
agreement."53 In short, if the parties conduct themselves as though
there was a contract (e.g., buyer takes possession and pays seller
money which seller accepts, or buyer makes improvements with
seller's consent), then this is good evidence that there was, in fact, a
contract formed. Why else were the parties behaving in that manner?
The overarching goal of the statute of frauds-prevention of false and
fraudulent claims that a contract exists-is therefore achieved even
though there is no formal signed writing. Although the statute of
frauds has the additional policy goals discussed above-certainty and
46. Id. (citing E. Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal
History, 63 L.Q. REv. 174, 178 (1947)).
47. Id.
48. See TRACEY FARRELL ET AL., 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of Frauds § 290 (1962).
49. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.15.
50. Id. (citing Butcher v. Stapley, (1865) 23 Eng. Rep. 524, 1 Vern. 363,
(Eng.); Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 Equity, 33 HARv. L.
REv. 929, 933-36 (1920)). The exception developed in the English courts as an
outgrowth of a method of conveying land: "Prior to the enactment of the Statute
of Frauds a permissible method of conveyance of land was 'livery of season,' an
oral transfer accompanied by a symbolic handing over of a twig or clump of earth
in the presence of witnesses." Id. (citing 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81A.01
(1997)).
51. Id.
52. Id. Justice Cardozo described the requirement thusly: "[There must be]
performance which alone and without the aid of words of promise is unintelligible
or at least extraordinary unless as an incident of ownership, assured if not
existing .... [W]hat is done must itself supply the key to what is promised. It is
not enough that what is promised may give significance to what is done." Id.
(quoting Burns v. McCormick, 135 N.E. 273, 273 (N.Y. 1922)).
53. Id. (citations omitted).
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channeling/deliberativeness-these goals give way in the case of the
part-performance exception, to the predominant statute of frauds goal
of ensuring that the claim of contract is genuine and not fraudulent
or perjured.54
Similar results are seen with other developed exceptions to the
statute's applicability. The courts have developed a performance-
based exception to the statute of frauds provision requiring that
contracts not capable of being in full by their terms within one year
of formation are generally required to be signed and in writing.55
Generally, the majority view is that "full performance on one side
renders a contract within the one year section enforceable."56 So, if a
contract requires three years of performance, for instance,
performance of one year would not take the contract out of the statute.
That is, part-performance is not sufficient under the one-year
provision.57 Rather, performance of all three years would meet the
exception. The idea behind the exception is the same as the real
estate part performance exception-the performance demonstrates a
strong likelihood that an actual contract was entered into.58
Another exception developed under the non-U.C.C. statute of
frauds is the "main purpose" exception to the guaranty provision of
the statute of frauds.59 The traditional guaranty provision of the
statute of frauds requires a signed writing when the alleged contract
is "to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for
the debt [or] default . . . [of] another person .... "60 The historical
reason for the guaranty provision is that there is typically no direct
economic benefit flowing to the alleged guarantor for making the
guaranty, and thus a writing is deemed necessary to prove the
obligation was undertaken.61 That is, the guaranty benefits the
creditor, and probably the primary debtor (without which guaranty
the creditor may not have extended credit to the primary debtor), but
54. Rabel, supra note 46, at 182.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
56. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.23 (citations omitted).
57. Id.
58. It is not always clear why the courts have required full performance as
an exception to the one-year provision and not allowed part performance to
suffice, as in the case of the real estate provision. According to Corbin: "The
explanation typically given for refusing to recognize the part performance
doctrine as an exception to the one-year statute is that the statute's evidentiary
purpose is not satisfied by part performance." MURRAY, supra note 1, § 19.15.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 116 (1981).
60. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1 (citing 29 Car. 2 c. 3, 8 Stat.
at Large 405).
61. LORD, supra note 2, § 22:1 ("Such promises, more than others, are subject
to that requirement principally because the promisor has received no benefit from
the transaction. This circumstance may make perjury more likely; when one has
received something, that fact itself, which is capable of proof, shows probable
liability while in the case of a guaranty, nothing but the promise is of evidentiary
value.").
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no economic benefit derives to the guarantor. However, the main
purpose exception applies when the guarantor's execution of the
guaranty does, in fact, have the principal effect of economically
benefitting him.62 That is, if the main purpose of the guarantor is to
protect his own economic interests, rather than merely to benefit the
primary debtor, the statute of frauds is not applicable and the
guaranty contract will be enforceable notwithstanding the lack of a
formal, signed writing.6 3 Again, the formalistic requirement of the
statute of frauds gives way to the overarching policy goal of avoiding
fraudulent claims of contract, when there is seen to be strong evidence
that the contract was actually entered into.
The U.C.C. statute of frauds provision also has several exceptions
to the formal writing requirement where the evidence that an
agreement was entered into is strong. First, the U.C.C. contains a
part performance exception, similar in principle to the part-
performance exception to the real estate provision.
64 The provision
simply requires both parties to the sale of goods contract to have
performed (either the seller has delivered the goods and the buyer has
accepted them, or the buyer has paid money for the goods which the
seller has accepted).65 As with the real estate part-performance
exception, such behavior by the parties is highly indicative that a
contract has in fact been entered into.66
Second, the U.C.C. contains a "merchant's confirmation"
exception. Under this exception, if one merchant sends a written,
signed confirmation of a contract to another merchant, then the
recipient merchant is bound to the contract, losing his statute of
frauds defense, if he does not object to the confirmation in writing
within ten days.67 Here again is strong evidence that a contract has
been entered into-if the recipient merchant disagrees with the
contract confirmation, he will speak up more often than not.
Third, the U.C.C. contains a "specially manufactured goods"
exception. Under this exception, a formal writing will be excused
62. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.6 ("Where the party promising
has for his object a benefit which he did not enjoy before his promise, which
benefit accrues immediately to himself, his promise is original, whether made
before, after or at the time of the promise of the third party, notwithstanding that
the effect is to promise to pay or discharge the debt of another.").
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 116 (1981).
64. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1977) ("A
contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable . . . with respect to goods for which payment
has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted.").
65. Id.
66. HAWKLAND, supra note 16, § 2-201:7.
67. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) ("Between merchants if within a reasonable time a
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is
received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies
the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of
objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.").
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where there is special or custom manufacture of goods obviously
intended for a particular buyer, and that buyer does not try to back
out of the contract until after the seller has made a substantial effort
to manufacture the custom goods.68 In all of these instances, the
U.C.C. statute of frauds deems other evidence to be sufficiently
indicative of the fact that a contract has been entered into, thus
excusing the formal requirement of a writing signed by the party to
be charged.69
Accordingly, the statute of frauds was enacted in England in
1677, and carried over to the United States, where to this day it
provides that certain categories of contracts are required to be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged in order to be
enforceable.70 The paramount policy goal furthered by the statute is
undoubtedly the prevention of false, fraudulent, perjured claims of a
contract's existence.71 Other purposes can be proffered for the
statute's writing requirement, including certainty, and a
channeling/deliberative function. However, these purposes are
seemingly subordinate to the dominant purpose of avoiding fraud,
especially given that in multiple instances the courts and legislatures
have developed exceptions to the writing requirement where strong
alternative evidence exists that a contract has in fact been entered
into.72 Ultimately, the goal of the statute of frauds is to ensure that
any claims of contract are legitimate.73
III. THE INITIAL RISE AND SUBSEQUENT FALL OF THE JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS EXCEPTION IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
The exception that is the subject of this Article is the judicial
admissions exception. As mentioned at the outset, practitioners in
the United States might well assume that judicially admitting the
existence of the contract completely satisfies the applicable statute of
frauds. However, if the contract is not one for the sale of goods
(making U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(b) applicable)74, then the question is
68. Id. § 2-201(3)(a) ("A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable . .. if the goods
are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, before notice
of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate
that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their
manufacture or commitments for their procurement.").
69. The U.C.C. also contains, of course, the judicial admissions exception. Id.
§ 2-201(3)(b). However, this will be the subject of the next Part.
70. See id. § 2-201.
71. LORD, supra note 2, § 21:1 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) ("A contract which does not satisfy the requirements
of subsection (1) [writing signed by party to be charged] but which is valid in
other respects is enforceable ... if the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale
488 [Vol. 55
STATUTE OF FRAUDS EXCEPTION
a complicated one, likely without a single answer across the
jurisprudential history of any one particular jurisdiction. The
purpose of this Part is to briefly trace the initial rise, and surprising
subsequent fall, of the judicial admissions exception in England, and
then in the United States. The subsequent Parts will then be devoted
to its revival in the United States, and whether such rise has yet
attained majority rule status.
As described in the previous Part the English Parliament
promulgated and passed the initial statute of frauds in 1677.75 In his
1951 article, Professor Stevens noted that several English decisions
in the early eighteenth century presupposed that if the defendant
confessed or admitted the contract, such would be sufficient for
purposes of removing the statute of frauds as an impediment to
enforcement.76 One case in 1713, Symondson v. Tweed
77 stated the
following:
In this case the Court declared, and the Council agreed likewise,
that if a man brings a bill for specific performance of a parol
agreement, setting forth the substance of it in a bill, and the
defendant by his answer confesses the agreement, that the Court
may in such case decree an execution thereof, notwithstanding
the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, because the defendant
confessing the agreement, there can be no danger of perjury from
contrariety of evidence, which was the only mischief that statute
intended to obviate.78
Although this statement was dicta because the defendant did not
actually admit the agreement in the proceeding, it was nevertheless
supportive of the general concept of a judicial admissions exception to
the statute.79 A similarly approving statement was set forth in a
treatise printed in 1737: "If an Agreement be by Parol, and not signed
by the Parties . . . if such Agreement is not confess'd in the Answer, it
cannot be carried into execution. But where in his Answer, he allows
the bargain to be compleat, and does not insist on any Fraud, there
can be no danger of Perjury; because he himself had taken away the
necessity of proving it."80 Later in the century, the 1789 case
was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the
quantity of goods admitted.").
75. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1 (citing 29 Car. 2 c. 3, 8 Stat.
at Large 405).
76. Stevens, supra note 21, at 361-67.
77. (1733) Precedents in Chancery 374 (Eng.).
78. Stevens, supra note 21, at 362 (emphasis added) (quoting Symondson,
Precedents in Chancery 374).
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing A TREATISE OF EQUITY bk. 1, ch. 3, § 8, at 19 (printed by E. and
R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1737)).
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Whitchurch v. Bevis81 stated the following regarding the state of
English judicial exceptions to the statute:
[T]his Court has laid down two exceptions, by which, if they are
to be sustained, it amounts to the same thing as if the statute
had made the exception of the two cases, that is where the
agreement is confessed by the answer, or where there is a part
performance ... . So, where the Court has laid it down as a
clear exception from the statute, that the danger of fraud and
perjury is avoided where the defendant admits the agreement,
it is requisite that he should answer the agreement .... 82
Professor Stevens cited multiple additional English cases
throughout the eighteenth century, which are consistent in their
acceptance of a defendant's admission of the contract in a judicial
proceeding as waiving the statute as a defense and making the
contract fully enforceable.83 After reviewing these English eighteenth
century decisions, Professor Stevens summarized the state of the
judicial admissions principle in the first century after the 1677
enactment of the statute:
Thus, for more than one hundred years after the passage of the
Statute of Frauds, there continued to be expressions of belief in
the principle that the statute was not intended to be used to
defeat performance of an admitted oral agreement. It is true
that the actual decisions to this effect are few, but the continuity
81. (1789) 2 Bro. C.C. 559 (Eng.).
82. Stevens, supra note 21, at 365 (emphasis added) (citing Whitchurch, 2
Bro. C.C. at 559).
83. See Simon v. Metivier (1766) 1 W. Bla. 599, 600 (Eng.) ("[W]here a man
admits the contract to have been made, it is out of the statute; for there can be
no perjury."); Attorney General v. Day (1749) 1 Ves. Sr. 218, 220 (Eng.) ("Yet on
all the questions on that statute in this court, the end and purport of making it
has been considered, viz. to prevent frauds and perjuries: so that any agreement,
in which there is no danger of either, the court has considered as out of the
statute; upon which there have been many cases: as in a bill by purchaser of lands
against the vendor, to carry into execution the agreement, though not in writing,
nor so stated by the bill: the vendor puts in an answer admitting the agreement
as stated in the bill; it takes it entirely out of the mischief; and there being no
danger of perjury, the court would decree it .... "); Cottington v. Fletcher (1740)
26 Eng. Rep. 498; 2 Atk. 156 498 (Eng.) ("I am of opinion that the plea ought to
be overruled. Undoubtedly if the plea stood by itself, it might have been a
sufficient plea; but coupled with the answer, which is a full admission of the facts,
it must overrule the plea."); Stevens, supra note 21, at at 362-66 (quoting Child
v. Godolphin (1732) I Dickens 39 (Eng.)) ("His Lordship said, the plea insisting
on the statute was proper, but then the defendant ought by answer to deny the
agreement; for if she confessed the agreement, the Court would decree a
performance notwithstanding the statute, for such confession would not be looked
upon as perjury, or intended to be prevented by the statute.").
490 [Vol. 55
STATUTE OF FRAUDS EXCEPTION
of the dicta demonstrates the force of the principle and an
inclination to adhere to it.84
Accordingly, it is clear that, although not frequently litigated, the
judicial admissions exception was fairly well ensconced with the
English case law at the close of the eighteenth century.
This established principle began to change, however, at the close
of the eighteenth century and into the beginning of the nineteenth
century. As Professor Stevens put it, "conflicting notions began to
creep in and these supplied the foundation for the ultimate reversal
of the old rule and the establishment of the [then] present-day
majority rule."85 An English law treatise, Treatise of Equity, had first
been published in 1737.86 Although it had previously seemed to
support the judicial admission as an exception to the statute's
applicability,87 it was republished in 1793 with additional notes by
John Fonblanque.88 Fonblanque added a new note to the 1793
edition, as follows:
If a defendant confess the agreement charged in the bill, there
is certainly no danger of fraud or perjury in decreeing
performance of such agreement. But it is of considerable
importance to determine whether the defendant be bound to
confess or deny a mere parol agreement not alleged to be in any
part executed? or, if he do confess it, whether he may not insist
on the statute, in bar of the performance of it? . . . If the
defendant's answer be not liable to contradiction by evidence
aliunde, the rule would furnish a temptation to perjury, by
giving the defendant a certain interest in denying the agreement;
since, if he confessed it, he would be bound to perform it .. .. 89
The English courts soon followed suit and began to hold that a
defendant could admit the contract, and yet still interpose the Statute
as a defense.90 For example, an 1865 English case observed that:
I do not think I can look at that portion of the answer which
admits the agreement, seeing that the defendant insists on the
statute of frauds. The defendant must answer, must swear to
the truth of his answer, and must sign it: if I were to make any
use of an admission so extorted, I should in effect repeal the
statute.91
84. Stevens, supra note 21, at 367.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 367; supra text accompanying note 82.
88. Stevens, supra note 21, at 367 (citing FONBLANQUE's EQUITY (1793)).
89. Id. at 367-68 (citing FONBLANQUE's EQUITY, note 40, bk. 1, ch. 3, § 8, 168,
et seq. (1793)) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 369-71.
91. Id. at 371 (citing Jackson v. Oglander (1865) 71 All ER at 544 (Eng.)).
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The key policy concern Fonblanque identified at this time (and
that which was followed by the courts) appeared to be that, if a
defendant were to be held to a contract if he confessed or admitted it
under oath, this would tempt such defendants to testify falsely that
no such agreement was entered-in a word, to commit perjury.92 As
Professor Stevens summarized this line of new cases by the English
courts:
These excerpts from Fonblanque and [cited English cases]
reveal the evolution of the thinking leading to the change in
attitude and in decisions. The rule that required the defendant
to admit or deny, under oath, every material allegation in the
complaint meant that if he confessed the agreement, it should
be enforced because it was proved by his own admission and
without the danger of the perjured testimony of others. But
such a result supplied the defendant with an inducement to
make a perjured denial of the agreement. It was considered
better to remove the temptation than to hold the defendant to
an agreement conscientiously admitted to have been entered
into. The way to do that, it was thought, was to expect his
answer to state the truth, but then to ignore the confession
which the rules of pleading and his conscience required him to
make, and to justify this under the pretext that the Statute of
Frauds itself exhibited that legislative intent, a theory first
evolved about a century and a quarter after the passage of that
act.93
As Professor Stevens noted, "[t]he decisions and texts are replete with
the statement hat the statute was intended to be used as a shield,
not a sword."94 But, he noted, with respect to this newly developed
rule allowing the defendant o use the defense notwithstanding his
confession of the contract: "Is this not permitting the statute to be
used as a sword?"95
The law in the United States, of course, generally followed the
English law in many important respects. As Professor Stevens
described, very early on in the history of the Republic, the decisions
92. Id. at 368 ("Such was the dilemma which the courts fashioned for
themselves as the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth. Having for one
hundred years believed that the statute was intended to prevent fraud as well as
perjury and that it would be against good conscience for defendant to defeat
performance of a parol agreement, the making of which he could not deny, they
came to the point where they would permit the defendant to perjure himself by
denying the making of the agreement or, if he admitted it, would ignore the
admission as a confession enforced by their own rules of pleading. This indeed
sounds inconsistent with our present-day ideas that one must admit or deny,
under oath, every material allegation in a verified complaint, and it must seem
to us as foreign to the purposes both of eighteenth and nineteenth century rules
of pleading and of the seventeenth century Statute of Frauds.").
93. Id. at 371.
94. Id. at 360.
95. Id.
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may have followed the eighteenth century English view that
confession or admission of the contract would support its
enforcement.96 Therefore, an early South Carolina decision, Smith v.
Brailsford,97 decreed specific performance of a contract against a
defendant, "by his answer which he signed, having acknowledged the
agreement, [which] the court considers .. . such an assent in writing
as overrules his plea of the statute of frauds."
98 That is, a judicial
admission was held to clearly take the contract out of the statute of
frauds.
However, as Professor Stevens noted, "the influence of the views
of [English courts] and of Fonblanque very promptly crossed the
Atlantic, and we find the latter's treatise cited and his thoughts
paraphrased by Cranch, C.J., in Thompson v. Jameson in 1806."99 In
that case, the court denied the defendant's assertion of the statute of
frauds defense, and reasoned as follows:
If the defendant is obliged to answer and confess a parol
agreement, there is no possible case in which a parol agreement
can be vacated by that statute; unless the defendant will commit
perjury by denying it. Instead therefore of preventing frauds
and perjuries, the statute would tend to increase them; for by
preventing the plaintiff from proving a parol agreement by any
other evidence than the defendant's own oath, it holds out to the
defendant he strongest emptation to perjury, and at the same
time gives him a perfect security against detection. If the
defendant is bound to confess the parol agreement it must be
because when confessed he could not avail himself of the statute.
But it is settled that he may avail himself of the statute. Hence
it seems to follow that he is not bound to confess; for this would
be to compel him to confess an immaterial fact.100
Stevens remarked that
[i]t seems not unnatural that, in the infancy of our national life,
our newly established courts, struggling to apply their own
replicas of the English statute of frauds, should have adopted
the changed English viewpoint that became current at the close
of the [eighteenth] century. That is the explanation of what we
find as the majority view in this country today [1951].101
From and after the turn of the nineteenth century, and into the
twentieth century, the American courts adhered to the rule that a
96. Id. at 372-73.
97. 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 350 (S.C. 1794).
98. Stevens, supra note 21, at 372 (citing Brailsford, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.)
at 352).
99. Id. (citing Thompson v. Jameson, 23 F. Cas. 1052 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No.
13, 960)).
100. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson, 23 F. Cas. No. at 1052).
101. Id. at 372-73.
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defendant could admit the contract, and yet also assert the statute of
frauds defense in the case of an oral agreement, with such regularity
that it became the unquestioned, dominant majority rule among the
states.10 2 This is reflected in a leading American treatise of the day
on the statute of frauds, where it is reported: "[B]y the unbroken
course of more modern decisions, it is now well settled that although
the defendant admits the agreement, it cannot be enforced without
the production of a written memorandum, if he insist upon the bar of
the statute."103 Professor Stevens objected to this development of the
law when he stated the following:
Equity courts found ways of preventing the statute from being
used to perpetrate a fraud in the three instances mentioned
above [(1) defendant's fraud in preventing a writing from being
executed, (2) part performance, and (3) judicial admissions] in
each of which there was proof to the court's satisfaction that a
contract had existed. Of the three, the most convincing, the one
with no attendant risk of perjured proof of a non-existent
contract, was the class of cases in which the defendant confessed
the contract. It is astonishing, therefore; that this is the only
one of the three exceptional instances that has not been
universally perpetuated, and it is more astonishing that the
removal of the temptation to the defendant to perjure himself
by denying the making of an agreement should have been
employed as a device for permitting him unethically to escape
an honest obligation.104
Although there were, at the time of Professor Stevens's article in
1951, a tiny handful of dissenting jurisdictions which allowed the
efficacy of judicial admissions to enforce the contract1 05  (a
phenomenon which this article will address in the next Part) this was
the state of American statute of frauds law in 1951 and beyond. But,
as Stevens observed, at the time of his article, "there [was] evidence
of increasing dissatisfaction with the majority rule."lo The next Part
will explore the germination and growth of the minority position-
allowing a judicial admissions exception-in the mid-twentieth
century and beyond.
IV. THE REBIRTH OF THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION EXCEPTION IN
NON-U.C.C. CASES THROUGH 1991, AS REPORTED BY PROFESSOR
SHEDD
As has just been established, by the turn of the nineteenth
century-in both England and the United States-the dominant
102. Id. at 356 (describing it as the "overwhelmingly accepted view").
103. Id. (quoting BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS § 515 (5th ed. 1895)).
104. Id. at 381.
105. Id. at 373-77.
106. Id. at 373.
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majority rule was that there effectively was no judicial admissions
exception under the statute of frauds. Meaning, a defendant was
allowed to admit the existence of an oral contract and yet still plead
the statute of frauds as a defense in order to avoid liability under the
contract.107 This rule continued to be the dominant majority rule
through the time of two articles that Professor Shedd published in
1984 and 1991.108 However, in these articles, Professor Shedd traced
the beginnings and growth of a small minority of jurisdictions that
began to reassert the efficacy of a judicial admissions exception for
rendering an oral contract fully enforceable, and removing the
applicability of the statute of frauds.10 9 The purpose of this Part is to
briefly summarize Professor Shedd's findings and conclusions so as to
set the stage for the following Part which will update Professor
Shedd's research to the present day.
A. Professor Shedd's 1984 Article
In his first 1984 article, Professor Shedd grouped his judicial
admissions research findings into four groups: "(1) the early cases
decided by courts in Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania;
(2) the cases decided during the 1960s; (3) those decided during the
1970s; and (4) those decided during the early 1980s."110 Each of
Shedd's groupings will be briefly summarized.
1. Early Adopting Cases: Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania
Professor Stevens, in his 1951 article, had actually first identified
Shedd's "early cases" when he noted a small handful of jurisdictions
which had recognized the judicial admissions exception in the early
part of the twentieth century, and Shedd began with an examination
of these jurisdictions.11 1 Iowa and New Jersey provided the earliest
reported decisions.112 In the Iowa Supreme Court case of Hagedorn
v. Hagedorn113 the court enforced an oral contract to sell land, in part
because the defendant admitted the formation of the contract.
114
Shedd also noted that a longstanding novel Iowa statutory provision
107. Shedd, supra note 20, at 4-5 (citing Stevens, supra note 21, at 371).
108. Id. at 1-2; Shedd, supra note 28, at 131-33.
109. Shedd, supra note 20, at 1-2; Shedd, supra note 28, at 131-33.
110. Shedd, supra note 20, at 5.
111. Stevens, supra note 21, at 373-77 (identifying the jurisdictions adopting
the judicial admissions exception as Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania); see also Shedd, supra note 20, at 5 n.18 ("Professor Stevens briefly
discussed some pre-1952 decisions in these jurisdictions. . . . These cases are
reviewed, and the subsequent decisions, if any, are examined in this article.").
112. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 373, 375-76.
113. 188 N.W. 980 (Iowa 1922).
114. Id. at 981-82.
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provided for enforcement of oral contracts not denied by the charged
party's pleadings.11 5 Shedd observed that
[t]he clarity of the Iowa statute in requiring enforcement of an
oral contract when the defendant admits that the agreement
existed is demonstrated by the fact that the Hagedorn case has
not been cited in other Iowa decisions pertaining to the judicial
admission exception. Apparently, the concept of this exception
is so well accepted that it no longer causes litigation in Iowa.116
New Jersey was next cited by Shedd (and Stevens) as an early adopter
of the judicial admissions exception.117 Degheri v. Carobine118
involved an oral agreement o release a property lien.119 Although no
writing existed, the court nevertheless upheld the oral contract
because the promising mortgagee admitted it had been made:
"[T]here is enough in this case to take it out of the mischief that the
Legislature sought to render impossible by the adoption of the
statute; and that is the fact that the promisor frankly admits the
making of the promise .... "12 0 Thus, Iowa and New Jersey were the
earliest adopters of the nascent American reborn judicial admissions
exception.
In 1945, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided Trossbach v.
Trossbach,121 a case which Shedd noted "could be called the first
modern-day opinion by the highest court in a state judicial system
regarding the acceptance of the judicial admission exception."122
Trossbach involved an oral agreement to purchase real estate. The
115. Shedd, supra note 20, at 6 n.25 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.34 (West
1950)) ("The [provisions of sections 622.32 and 622.33], relating merely to the
proof of contracts, shall not prevent the enforcement of those not denied in the
pleadings, except in cases when the contract is sought to be enforced, or damages
recovered for the breach thereof, against some person other than the person who
made it.").
116. Id. at 6-7.
117. Shedd, supra note 20, at 7; Stevens, supra note 21, at 375-76.
118. 135 A. 518 (N.J. Ch. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 140 A. 406 (N.J. 1928).
119. Shedd, supra note 20, at 7 (citing Degheri, 135 A. at 518).
120. Id. (quoting Degheri, 135 A. at 521-22). Degheri was cited by both
Stevens and Shedd for the proposition that New Jersey recognizes the judicial
admission exception. Importantly in that case, the admission appeared to come
after the pleadings, in the live testimony portion of the case. Somewhat
contrariwise, see the following New Jersey decisions seemingly citing the rule
allowing both admission of the contract and also pleading the statute of frauds
as a defense. Cf. In re Estate of Yates, 845 A.2d 714, 719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004) ("[W]hen one admits the parol agreement without offering a defense
based on the Statute of Frauds the benefit of the statute is waived."); Droutman
v. E.M. & L. Garage, 20 A.2d 75, 76 (N.J. 1941) ("The third [exception to the
writing requirement] is where the parol contract alleged in the bill is admitted in
the answer without invoking the statute.") (emphasis added). For purposes of this
Article, I will continue to view New Jersey as having adopted the judicial
admissions exception, as have numerous other courts and commentators.
121. 42 A.2d 905 (Md. 1945).
122. Shedd, supra note 20, at 7 (citing Trossbach, 42 A.2d 905).
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seller, in resisting the agreement, both admitted the contract had
been entered, but also pleaded the statute of frauds in defense.
123 The
court, noting the primary purpose of the statute of frauds was to
protect against fraudulent assertions of formed contracts, stated the
following:
This rule, that the Statute of Frauds may be "insisted upon"
even though the oral contract is admitted in the answer, was
not indigenous to the statute, but rather to now forgotten lore
of equity pleading. After decisions to the contrary, the rule was
established more than a century after the enactment of the
statute. It was based largely on the view that "calling upon a
party to answer a parol agreement certainly lays him under a
great temptation to commit perjury."
Under existing procedure, the purpose of the Statute of Frauds
is to protect a party, not from temptation to commit perjury but
from perjured evidence against him. The purpose of evidence is
to prove facts. Admissions of a party in testifying, though in
form evidence, are in essence not mere evidence, but make
evidence against him unnecessary. We think the Statute of
Frauds requires no more.124
Thus, as of 1945, Maryland had firmly adopted the judicial
admissions exception to its statute of frauds. Multiple subsequent
decisions affirmed this as the law in Maryland.
125
In 1946, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Zlotziver v.
Zlotziver,126 an oral separation agreement between a husband and
wife, whereby the husband was obligated to convey real and personal
property to her.127 The husband admitted that he had entered into
the agreement, but nevertheless asserted the statute of frauds as a
defense since the agreement was oral and involved promises to convey
real estate.128 In responding to this argument, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated the following:
123. Id. at 8.
124. Trossbach, 42 A.2d at 908. The opinion alternatively stated:
"Furthermore, admissions of a party in the form of testimony would constitute
sufficient 'memoranda' under" the statute of frauds. Id.
125. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 9-11 (citing Sealock v. Hockley, 45 A.2d 744,
746 (Md. 1946); Dove v. White, 126 A.2d 835, 838-39 (Md. 1956); Pollin v.
Perkins, 165 A.2d 908, 911 (Md. 1960); Janowitz v. Slagle, 242 A.2d 123, 145 (Md.
1968); Friedman v. Clark, 248 A.2d 867, 870-71 (Md. 1969); Lambdin v.
Przyborowski, 242 A.2d 150, 152 (Md. 1968); Adams v. Wilson, 284 A.2d 434,
438-39 (Md. 1971)).
126. 49 A.2d 779 (Pa. 1946).
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The statute of frauds . .. does not absolutely invalidate an oral
contract relating to land but is intended merely to guard against
perjury on the part of one claiming under the alleged
agreement. Accordingly, if the title holder admits, either in his
pleading or his testimony, that he did in fact enter into the
contract, the purpose of the statute of frauds is served and the
oral agreement will be enforced by the court.129
Subsequent Pennsylvania decisions have confirmed Pennsylvania's
adherence to the judicial admissions exception.130 Thus, as of 1950,
these four jurisdictions-Iowa, New Jersey, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania-had recognized that a judicial admission of an oral
contract fully satisfied the predominant underlying purpose of the
statute of frauds, thus removing the applicability of the defense and
rendering the contract fully enforceable.131
2. 1960s Cases: No Further Adoptions
Shedd cited two 1960s cases discussing the judicial admissions
exception, one in Minnesota and one in Arkansas.132 Neither case
conclusively adopted the judicial admissions exception in their
respective jurisdictions, although both were notably sympathetic
towards the doctrine. In Radke v. Brenon,133 the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated: "Although we have followed the majority rule that
admission of the contract does not preclude assertion of the statute of
frauds, an admission that a contract was made certainly cannot be
129. Id.
130. Id. at 12-15 (citing Suchan v. Swope, 53 A.2d 116, 118 (Pa. 1947); Mezza
v. Beilotti, 53 A.2d 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1947)).
131. Although not the focus of Shedd's article (nor of the present Article), it
should be noted that it was also around this point in the timeline that the U.C.C.
was created. First approved in its initial form by the Uniform Law Commission
in 1953, the U.C.C. gradually became the law in all of the states throughout the
1950s and 1960s. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation
and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 8-10
(1967). Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs transactions in goods, including contracts
for the sale of goods. See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and a
ccompanying text. And, as has already been seen, the U.C.C. bucked then-
existing laws regarding the statute of frauds and judicial admissions, when
Section 2-201(3)(b) provided that "[a] contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (1) [writing signed by party to be charged] but which
is valid in other respects is enforceable ... if the party against whom enforcement
is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond
the quantity of goods admitted." U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw
COMM'N 1977). Because this provision only governs the statute of frauds when
contracts for the sale of goods are involved, the discussion will continue with the
state of the judicial admissions exception in non-U.C.C. cases. Id.
132. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 15-16 (citing Radke v. Brenon, 134 N.W.2d
887 (Minn. 1965); Arnett v. Lillard, 436 S.W.2d 106 (Ark. 1969)).
133. 134 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. 1965).
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ignored when all other evidence submitted supports the same
conclusion."134 Shedd pondered this result and noted:
The real question that Radke poses is why did the Minnesota
Supreme Court refuse to go the next logical step and join the
view of Maryland's and Pennsylvania's judiciary regarding the
judicial admission exception? From a logical viewpoint, the
answer to this question is not clear. The best explanation
probably rests in any court's hesitancy to leave a majority
position when a case can be rightly decided within the scope of
the position.135
In Arnett v. Lillard,136 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld an oral
trust agreement involving real estate, since neither party raised the
statute of frauds as a defense.137 The court noted that neither party
thought the tatute was applicable (the appellants believed the part-
performance exception applied, and the appellee believed the Statute
inapplicable to a constructive trust, which was part of the relief that
had been sought).138 However, the court added by way of dicta its own
sua sponte observation, citing the Maryland authorities: "Further, in
this case both parties, in their testimony, admitted the existence of
the oral agreement which constituted the express trust. This fact has
been held to prevent the application of the statute of frauds to an
express oral trust of an interest in land."139 Thus, although both cases
expressed some support for the judicial admissions doctrine, neither
adopted it-Radke because the court avoided unnecessarily departing
from the majority view, and Arnett simply because the issue was not
before the court. Accordingly, as the 1960s drew to a close, Shedd
observed that the four early adoption jurisdictions were the only ones
that had adopted the judicial admissions exception outside of the sale
of goods context.
3. The 1970s Cases: Additional Adoptions
Shedd reported that in the 1970s three additional jurisdictions
had adopted the judicial admissions exception.140 In Adams-Riker,
Inc. v. Nightingale,141 the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the
134. Shedd, supra note 20, at 16 (citing Radke, 134 N.W. at 891).
135. Id.
136. 436 S.W.2d 106 (Ark. 1969).
137. Shedd, supra note 20, at 16 (citing Arnett, 436 S.W.2d at 111).
138. Arnett, 436 S.W.2d at 111.
139. Id. (citing Trossbach v. Trossbach, 42 A.2d 905, 907-08 (Md. 1945)).
140. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 16-23 (citing Adams-Riker, Inc. v.
Nightingale, 383 A.2d 1042, 1044 (R.I. 1978)). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
had previously cited the authorities allowing a judicial admissions exception with
some favor, as in the Radke case, but stopped short of adopting the exception
fully. Id. at 16-17 (citing Peacock Realty Co. v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc.,
278 A.2d 405, 409-10 (R.I. 1971)).
141. 383 A.2d 1042 (R.I. 1978).
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exception in a case where both parties admitted the oral agreement,
noting that commentators (including Corbin) advocated for its
applicability.142 In Wolf v. Crosby,143 the Delaware Court of Chancery
also discussed the history of the judicial admissions exception in the
United States, and expressly adopted the minority position that
allows the exception to satisfy the statute of frauds.144 Shedd also
reported that, in Powers v. Hastings,145 the Washington Court of
Appeals discussed the minority position held by Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Rhode Island, and held in favor of the
plaintiff based on the defendant's multiple admissions of the oral
agreement. 146
Shedd reported other decisions of interest to the judicial
admissions discussion in the 1970s. First, a Maine case mentioned
the exception with some approval, but avoided establishing a judicial
admissions exception to the applicable non-U.C.C. statute of frauds
because the court concluded that the contract at issue was
predominantly for the sale of goods (and thus the U.C.C. statute of
frauds, and its express judicial admissions exception, applied).147
Second, two Illinois cases held that the statute of frauds would not be
considered an impediment to the enforcement of agreements that had
been reached and admitted in an open court session.148 The Illinois
appeals court stated:
In the case at bar, an agreement was arrived at by the parties
and stated in open court; it was dictated to a court reporter and
made a matter of record; each of the parties and their respective
attorneys agreed to and understood the terms of the agreement.
The entire proceeding was under the guidance and supervision
142. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 17-18 (citing Adams-Riker, 383 A.2d at
1044).
143. 377 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1977).
144. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 20-22 (citing Wolf v. Crosby, 377 A.2d 22,
25-26 (Del. Ch. 1977)).
145. 582 P.2d 897 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
146. Shedd, supra note 20, at 22-23 (citing Powers v. Hastings, 582 P.2d 897,
900 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 612 P.2d 371 (Wash. 1980)). Unbeknownst to
Shedd at the time of his article, the Washington Supreme Court subsequently
retracted its support for the judicial admission exception and decided it would
not be applicable in Washington. Key Design, Inc. v. Moser, 983 P.2d 653, 659-
61 (Wash. 1991).
147. Shedd, supra note 20, at 19-20 n.105 (citing Dehahn v. Innes, 356 A.2d
711, 718 (Me. 1976)) ("We note that the present contract is predominantly a
contract for the sale and purchase of goods and that the gravel pit involved
represented only about 5% of the total price agreed upon. Under the
circumstances of this case, we hold that the salutary principle embodied in 11
M.R.S.A., § 2-201(3)(b) applicable to a contract for the sale of goods alone should
apply equally to the instant oral contract involving both goods and real estate.").
148. Id. at 23-24 (citing Kalman v. Bertacchi, 373 N.E.2d 550, 556 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978); Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982)).
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of the court and clearly, the mischiefs anticipated by the Statute
of Frauds could not arise in this case.1
49
The Illinois cases were reported by Shedd, although their
circumstances are significantly different than the typical scenario
where the judicial admissions exception is otherwise applicable. Not
including these atypical Illinois cases, Shedd determined that seven
jurisdictions had clearly adopted the judicial admissions exception
outside the sale of goods context by the end of the 1970s.
4. The First 1980s Cases: Two Additional Adoptions
The final part of Shedd's 1984 article continued into the early
1980s, reporting two additional jurisdictions adopting the judicial
admissions exception.150 First was Alaska, which enacted the judicial
admissions exception explicitly by statute, in language similar to
U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(b).151 Second was the District of Columbia,
Court of Appeals which adopted and applied the judicial admissions
exception in a case involving attorney stipulations of an oral contract,
citing the U.C.C. and the Maryland cases.152 One New York decision
included a dissenting opinion arguing that the judicial admissions
exception should be adopted, but the majority felt it unnecessary
because it determined that no judicial admission was actually
made.153
5. Shedd 1984 Article Conclusion
Shedd observed from the above findings that, as of the
publication of his article in 1984, there were nine jurisdictions (eight
states and the District of Columbia) that had squarely adopted the
minority position judicial admissions exception outside the
applicability of Article 2 of the U.C.C.154 The Illinois decisions
additionally approved the limited principle of upholding agreements
made in open court.155 Shedd noted that five of the adoptions had
come since 1977-in what was then a short seven-year period leading
149. Kalman, 373 N.E.2d at 556.
150. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 24-25 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020
(1982); Hackney v. Morelite Constr., 418 A.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
151. Id. at 24 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020 (1982)) ("Exceptions to statute
of frauds. A contract, promise, or agreement which is subject to [section] 10 of
this chapter, which does not satisfy the requirements of that section, but which
is otherwise valid is enforceable if .. . (4) the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits, voluntarily or involuntarily, in his pleadings or at any other action
or proceeding the making of an agreement."). A subsequent Alaska case applied
the section to determine that an oral contract was enforceable under the newly
enacted provision. See Fleckenstein v. Faccio, 619 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Alaska 1980).
152. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 25 (citing Hackney, 418 A.2d at 1065).
153. Id. at 25-26 (citing Haskins v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 429 N.Y.S.2d 874,
877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
154. Id. at 26-27.
155. Id. at 27.
2020] 501
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
up the publication of his article. Based on this small, but seemingly
clear trend, Shedd observed:
The judicial decisions examined indicated there is a strong and
rapidly growing-albeit still small-number of jurisdictions
that may someday result in the judicial admission exception to
the statute of frauds to be the position accepted by the majority
of states. Such a trend clearly seems to have started.156
Thus, Shedd's 1984 article was hopeful that the judicial admissions
exception was on its way towards growing into the dominant national
majority rule. That optimism, it turned out, may have been
premature.
B. Professor Shedd's 1991 Article: Two More Adoptions
Seven years after his initial article in 1984, Professor Shedd
wrote additional follow-up articles published in 1991, which were
designed to update his research of jurisdictions adopting the judicial
admissions exception.157 His update found that two additional
jurisdictions had adopted the judicial admissions exception.158 In
Bentley v. Potter,159 the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he statute
of frauds is a defense that can be waived by a failure to plead it as an
affirmative defense, admitting its existence in the pleadings, or
admitting at trial the existence and all essential terms of the
contract."160 Citing cases from Maryland and Delaware in support of
the judicial admissions exception, the Bentley court held that "[s]ince
a purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury on
the part of one claiming that another had guaranteed a debt, the one
opposing the claim cannot complain if he admits the existence of the
guarantee."161 In Paris Utility District v. A.C. Lawrence Leather
Co.,162 a Maine federal district court concluded that the following
represented Maine law: "The purpose of the statute of frauds is
primarily evidentiary, and to deny enforcement of an agreement
despite the charged party's admission of the facts essential to the
agreement's existence would be an impermissible use of the statute
of frauds to perpetrate a fraud."163 Additionally, a Massachusetts
156. Id.
157. Shedd, supra note 28; Shedd, supra note 29.
158. Shedd, supra note 28, at 134-35 (citing Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617,
621 (Utah 1984); Paris Util. Dist. v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 665 F. Supp. 944,
957 (D. Me. 1987)).
159. 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984).
160. Bentley, 694 P.2d at 621 (citations omitted).
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. 665 F. Supp. 944 (D. Me. 1987)).
163. Paris Util. Dist., 665 F. Supp. at 957 (citations omitted). This view was
subsequently expressly accepted by the Maine Supreme Court. Lush v. Terri &
Ruth F/V, 324 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D. Me. 2004) ("Under Maine law, admitting the
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decision joined Illinois in expressly upholding an oral agreement
made in open court, notwithstanding the statute of frauds.
164
Thus, in the span of a decade, only two additional states had
adopted the judicial admissions exception: Utah and Maine.
165 Shedd
had concluded in 1984 that the trend was toward a rapid adoption of
the exception, but his conclusion was more tempered in 1991: "The
law in the area of the judicial admissions exception in non-U.C.C.
cases is developing very slowly. Although some additional
jurisdictions have recognized the logic of the exception, the trend has
not kept pace with the late 1970s."166 As of the conclusion of Shedd's
published research in 1991, he surmised that ten states (plus the
District of Columbia) had statutes or decisions adopting the judicial
admissions exception.167 Clearly, Shedd believed that the judicial
admissions exception should be the majority rule, but just as clearly,
it was still a distinct minority rule at the conclusion of his published
research as of 1991.168
V. AN UPDATE ON THE ADOPTION OF THE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
EXCEPTION THROUGH THE PRESENT
The state of the judicial admissions exception outside the U.C.C.
context does not appear to have been updated or reported since
Professor Shedd's 1991 publication. One of the primary purposes of
this Article is to provide such an update. This Part will: (1) report
cases from the 1980s adopting or applying the exception that
Professor Shedd may have overlooked, (2) report cases from the 1990s
to the present that have adopted or applied the exception, and (3)
report cases which have explicitly rejected the doctrine within the
past few decades.
existence of facts necessary to the formation of a contract takes the oral
agreement outside the statute of frauds.").
164. Shedd, supra note 28, at 134 (citing Dominick v. Dominick, 463 N.E.2d
564, 568 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)). As Shedd observed: "This decision, while
seemingly acknowledging the positive attributes of the judicial admissions
exception, cannot be cited as adding Massachusetts to the jurisdictions that have
given the exception full recognition. Indeed, Dominick reaches a conclusion
similar to that found in the Illinois case of Kalman v. Bertacchi." Id. (citing
Kalman v. Bertacchi, 373 N.E.2d 550, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)).
165. Shedd, supra note 28, at 141.
166. Id. at 133.
167. The states, according to Shedd's final research published in 1991, were:
Iowa, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Rhode Island,
Washington, Alaska, Utah, and Maine. The District of Columbia had adopted it
as well, and Illinois and Massachusetts had limited holdings upholding oral
agreements made in open court. Id. at 140-41.
168. Id. at 139.
2020] 503
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
A. Overlooked 1980s Cases Adopting the Exception
There are several cases decided during the 1980s that Shedd did
not report, that seemingly adopt the judicial admissions exception or
at least hold that an admission satisfies the applicable statute of
frauds.169 In some instances, the cases do not cite the longstanding
history of the exception, in the same way as some of the seminal cases
cited by Shedd. Nevertheless, the following five cases from the 1980s
do allow for judicial admissions to render an oral contract within the
applicable statute of frauds enforceable.
In Robert Harmon & Bore, Inc. v. Jenkins,170 a South Carolina
court of appeals held that
a pleading admitting a parol agreement that is within the
statute of frauds may constitute a sufficient writing within the
statute so as to enable the court to enforce the contract . . .. A
pleading can be regarded as a sufficient writing within the
statute even if the pleader at the same time sets up and relies
upon the statute as a defense.17 1
In Stoetzel v. Continental Textile Corp. of America,172 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals countenanced the judicial admissions
exception as the law of Missouri.173 In Hayes v. Hartelius,174 the
Montana Supreme Court acknowledged the judicial admissions
exception when it stated "it would be a fraud on the defendant to allow
plaintiffs to admit to the contract, and then allow them to avoid its
obligations by asserting the statute of frauds. We refuse to
countenance such a result."175
169. See Stoetzel v. Cont'l Textile Corp., 768 F.2d 217, 222 (8th Cir. 1985);
Hayes v. Hartelius, 697 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Mont. 1985); Harmon v. Jenkins, 318
S.E.2d 371, 373 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Troyer v. Troyer, 341 S.E.2d 182, 185 (Va.
1986); Timberlake v. Heflin, 379 S.E.2d 149, 153 (W. Va. 1989).
170. 318 S.E.2d 371 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
171. Id. at 373-74 (citations omitted). The Harmon case cites, among other
cases, Smith v. Brailsford, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 350, 352 (1794). Interestingly,
the Smith case was cited by Professor Stevens as establishing that, in the early
days of the United States, the judicial admissions exception was the law in
England and the United States, just before the tendency to deny the exception
"very promptly crossed the Atlantic." See Stevens, supra note 21, at 372. Given
that Robert Harmon cites Smith directly, it would appear likely that South
Carolina never discarded the judicial admission exception in the first place.
172. 768 F.2d 217, 222 (8th Cir. 1985).
173. Id. ("[W]e are not prepared to say the District Court misconstrued
Missouri law if it relied on the judicial admission theory to remove the contract
from the operation of the Statute.").
174. 697 P.2d 1349 (Mont. 1985).
175. Id. at 1353. Subsequent Montana Supreme Court cases have confirmed
that the judicial admissions exception is the law in Montana. Kluver v. PPL
Mont., LLC, 293 P.3d 817, 823 (Mont. 2012); see Morton v. Lanier, 55 P.3d 380,
384 (Mont. 2002).
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Additionally, in Troyer v. Troyer,176 the Virginia Supreme Court
upheld the admission of a deposition, given under oath, as sufficient
to satisfy the statute of frauds: "To hold otherwise under the facts and
circumstances of this case could result in a fraud or perpetrate a
wrong, the particular evils the statute seeks to prevent."1
77 In
Timberlake v. Heflin,178 the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted
the judicial admissions exception: "We recognize, as have other
courts, that a pleading may, in appropriate circumstances, be
sufficient to take a parol contract out of the statute of frauds. In a
related line of cases, representative of the modern trend, courts have
crafted a 'judicial admission' exception to the statute of frauds."
179
Thus, by the end of the 1980s, the judicial admissions picture was
somewhat brighter than what Shedd had concluded. Rather than
only ten states (plus the District of Columbia) adopting the exception,
it appears to have been fifteen states (plus the District of Columbia).
Nevertheless, as of 1990, the exception was still a decidedly minority
position.
B. Updating to the Present: Furthering Shedd's Research
This Article updates Professor Shedd's research from the point
that he published his last article on the subject, in several ways.
First, by reporting the states which have adopted the judicial
admissions exception from 1991 to the present, either by case decision
or by legislation. Second, by considering states which contemplated
the exception during the same timeframe but stopped short of fully
admitting it for various reasons-sometimes because the issue was
not properly before the court. Third, this Article will go further than
Shedd's articles by pointing out several states which have rendered
decisions explicitly rejecting the judicial admissions exception.
180
After all decisions are collected and reported, whether the judicial
admissions exception remains a minority rule will be considered, with
additional suggestions for implementation of the rule nationwide.
1. Jurisdictions Adopting the Exception
Multiple jurisdictions have adopted or applied the judicial
admissions exception since the publication of Shedd's articles. The
1990s brought several such adoptions or applications-apparently
176. 341 S.E.2d 182 (Va. 1986).
177. Id. at 186. Although the Troyer opinion contained no prior citations to
support its judicial admissions holding, it has been subsequently cited as
supporting the judicial admissions exception. See Vienna Props., Inc. v. Cudd,
No. 99787, 1990 WL 10039339, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 24, 1990) (citing Troyer,
341 S.E.2d 182).
178. 379 S.E.2d 149 (W. Va. 1989).
179. Id. at 152.
180. See, e.g., Durham v. Harbin, 530 So. 2d 208, 210-11 (Ala. 1988); Brown
v. Gravlee Lumber Co., Inc., 341 So. 2d 907, 912 (Miss. 1977).
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seven in total. Starting in 1991, in Kelly v. Hodges,181 an Idaho
appellate court held that "the statute of frauds is inapplicable when
a contract . .. is mutually acknowledged to exist."182 In 1992, in
Bower v. Jones,183 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
admissions in a deposition satisfied the statute of frauds under
Illinois law.184 In Connecticut, a 1993 (unpublished) opinion found
that admissions that certain promissory notes were executed obviated
the need for proof and thus defeated the statute of frauds
argument.185 In 1994, the New York legislature enacted a statutory
judicial admission exception for non-real estate cases, which is
substantially similar to the U.C.C. exception.186 Although the New
York real estate statute of frauds contains no such judicial admissions
exception, there is case law support for the judicial admissions
exception as well.187 In 1998, California also enacted a statutory
judicial admissions exception much like the U.C.C. version of the
exception.188 A 1996 Tennessee bankruptcy court opinion found that
the statute of frauds was inapplicable in Tennessee when "the party
asserting it as a defense admits the existence and validity of the oral
181. 811 P.2d 48 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
182. Id. at 50 (quoting Frantz v. Parke, 729 P.2d 1068, 1071-72 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1986)).
183. 978 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1992).
184. Id. at 1009 (quoting II FARNSWORTH ON CONTRAcTS § 6.7, at 134 (1990))
("To the extent that the statute's function is viewed as evidentiary, it is difficult
to see why the statute should not be satisfied by a written admission in a
pleading, stipulation, or deposition.").
185. Vernes v. State St. Mortg. Co., No. CV90 033966S, 1993 WL 171363, at
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 18, 1993) ("The defendants also raise the statute of
frauds, which requires an instrument in writing before someone can be bound to
answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. The simple answer to this
argument is that by their answer, the defendants admitted 'that they executed
promissory notes in the sums alleged'. That admission is a binding one upon
them and obviates need for proof.").
186. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(b)(3)(c) (McKinney 2002) ("There is
sufficient evidence that a contract has been made if ... [t]he party against whom
enforcement is sought admits in its pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that
a contract was made.. .. ").
187. Id. § 5-703; see Roberts v. Karimi, 79 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (E.D.N.Y.
1999), rev'd on other grounds, 251 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an
affidavit regarding a real estate contract provided in another lawsuit was a
sufficient "writing" and defeated a statute of frauds defense); Estate of
Meledandri, 437 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. 1981) (stating that "[c]learly
pleadings and court affidavits can be a memorandum, writing, sufficient to bring
an oral contract out of the [real estate] Statute of Frauds," but failing to find such
a memorandum where the facts indicated that the parties contemplated signing
a particular written form before being bound to the agreement).
188. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(b)(3)(c) (West 2015) ("There is sufficient evidence
that a contract has been made in any of the following circumstances .. . [t]he
party against whom enforcement is sought admits in its pleading, testimony, or
otherwise in court that a contract was made."). Notably, California did not add
the judicial admissions exception to its version of U.C.C. § 2-201 until the 1988
legislative session, which amendment was effective in 1990.
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contract in his answer to the complaint."189 At the close of the 1990s,
in Herrera v. Herrera,190 a 1999 New Mexico Court of Appeals
decision, the court applied the U.C.C. judicial admission exception to
a martial settlement agreement by analogy: "Although the [U.C.C.]
applies to sales of goods and not marital settlement agreements, this
statute codifies a general exception to the statute. This 'sensible
provision represents legislative recognition of a policy common' to the
statute of frauds."19 1
Since the year 2000, only two additional states appear to have
applied or adopted the judicial admissions exception. The first was a
2002 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision applying Oklahoma law,
Gibson v. Arnold.192 In Gibson, the party asserting the statute of
frauds cited an earlier Oklahoma case that allowed a litigant to both
admit the contract was made and yet still assert the statute of frauds
as a defense.193 The Tenth Circuit declined to follow the older case,
and stated:
[The older case is] at odds with the growing weight of authority
in this country because virtually every court that has addressed
the issue during the last twenty-five years has held that judicial
admissions are an exception to the statute of frauds.
Assuredly, the rationale for the judicial admission exception is
"that the purpose of the statute of frauds is to shield persons
with interests [covered by the statute] from being deprived of
those interests by perjury, not to arm contracting parties with
a sword they may use to escape bargains they rue." . .. "If the
defendant admits under oath that a contract was formed, the
purposes of the statute of frauds are served, and the contract
will be afforded full legal effect."194
The Tenth Circuit accordingly applied the judicial admissions
exception as the law in Oklahoma.195 The last case discovered
applying or adopting the judicial admissions exception is a 2008
Arizona case, Owens v. ME. Schepp Partnership.196 In Owens, the
Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the judicial admission
exception was applicable in Arizona: "An admission under oath by the
party opposing enforcement of an oral contract that the contract
exists can take the agreement outside of the statute of frauds."197 The
189. In re Fowler, 201 B.R. 771, 776 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (citing Love &
Amos Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 378 S.W.2d 430, 439 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1963)).
190. 974 P.2d 675 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
191. Id. at 679.
192. 288 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2002).
193. Id. at 1246 (citing Purcell v. Corder, 124 P. 457, 460 (Okla. 1912)).
194. Id. at 1246-47 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 1247.
196. 182 P.3d 664 (Ariz. 2008).
197. Id. at 671 (citing MURRAY, supra note 1, § 129 cmt. D).
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court found no reason not to recognize the judicial admissions
exception, given that it is a "common-sense recognition that if the
defendant admitted in a pleading that he had made a contract with
the plaintiff, the purpose of the statute of frauds-protection against
fraudulent or otherwise false contractual claims-was fulfilled."1 98
In all, from the time of Shedd's published 1991 articles through
the present, it appears that nine additional jurisdictions have adopted
or applied some form of the judicial admissions exception outside the
U.C.C. sale of goods context. The pace has continued since Shedd's
initial observations, albeit not rapidly. Coupled with Shedd's own
findings, and my observations of cases that Shedd may have
overlooked through 1991, this brings the total number of apparent
adoptions or applications to twenty-four states, plus the District of
Columbia. However, before finalizing any counts and observations of
the state of the rule, this Article next turns to cases decided since
1991 addressing the exception without a seemingly clear adoption.
The Article then looks at states which have rejected the doctrine
explicitly.
2. Inconclusive Cases
Taking the period from 1991 through the present, there were
several cases that implicated the judicial admissions rule in some way
but stopped short of fully adopting or applying it in the traditional
sense.199 Three states-Wyoming, Kansas, and Nevada- reported
cases which upheld oral agreements that had been recited and agreed
to orally and in open court.200 Other cases discussed the admissions
198. Id. (citing DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir.
1988)). In Owens, no admission had in fact occurred, but the court nevertheless
granted a motion for summary judgment, thereby denying a request to forestall
such ruling on the hope that an admission may yet be forthcoming if the litigation
were extended. Id. at 671-72. A bankruptcy court in Arizona, citing Owens, has
subsequently applied the judicial admissions exception as the law in Arizona. In
re Cottontail, LLC, 498 B.R. 242, 248 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2013).
199. See Orthome Inc. v. A.B. Med., Inc., 990 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 1993);
E.C. Menendez v. Tex. Comm. Bank, 730 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
200. See Brockman v. Sweetwater Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 826 F. Supp. 1328,
1333 (D. Wyo. 1993), aff'd, 25 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that an oral
settlement agreement agreed to at a settlement conference conducted by a
magistrate judge was not within the statute of frauds); In re Marriage of
Takusagawa, 166 P.3d 440, 447 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (holding the statute of
frauds did not prevent an oral separation agreement between spouses in open
court); Grisham v. Grisham, 289 P.3d 230, 235 (Nev. 2012) (upholding hearing
transcript as sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the statute of frauds). In
Takusagawa, the court added further support for a judicial admissions doctrine
generally, based on the presence of the explicit U.C.C. exception:
[S]tatutory and caselaw developments over the past few decades
support an exception to applicability of the statute of frauds when a
judicial admission of the agreement has been made. The key statutory
development has been U.C.C. § 2-201, adopted in 1965 in Kansas as
K.S.A. 84-2-201. It explicitly provides a judicial-admission exception
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exception but stopped short of fully adopting or applying it, generally
because an admission was not found to have been made under the
facts at issue.201 For example, in Edwards Industries, Inc. v.
DTE/BE, Inc.,202 the Nevada Supreme Court agreed that "[a]
complete admission in court by the party to be charged should
dispense with the necessity of any writing whatever," but found that
the resisting party had not made a complete admission factually.
203
A Michigan appellate decision held similarly, stating: "Even if this
Court were to adopt a judicial admission exception, plaintiff has not
presented sufficient evidence to invoke such an exception."
204 A
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion found similarly with regard
to Indiana law.205 A 2015 Massachusetts decision, Barrie-Chivian v.
Lepler,206 affirmed a judgment against a defendant who orally
promised to guarantee a loan, under a theory of promissory estoppel
(rather than formal contract), and held his statute of frauds argument
was unavailing based on his "trial testimony, [which,] like a partial
writing, performs an evidentiary function that obviates the concerns
implicated by the Statute of Frauds."207 Depending on how one views
them, it can be argued that these states should be "counted" as
recognizing the judicial admissions exception. Certainly, they could
be cited by any subsequent cases in these states that decide to
formally adopt or apply the exception.208 But, because these cases do
to the statute of frauds for cases covered by the U.C.C. Because statutes
on the same subject are in pari materia and are to be construed to
achieve consistent results whenever possible, the general statute of
frauds and the U.C.C. statute of frauds should be construed in similar
ways to the extent possible. Thus, if possible, the general statute of
frauds should be interpreted to include a judicial-admission exception
since the U.C.C. statute of frauds has one.
Id. at 447 (citations omitted). Although this language is very supportive of the
judicial admissions exception in Kansas generally, the issue was not before the
court beyond the limited issue of upholding the oral agreement made in and
acknowledged in open court.
201. See Consolidation Servs., Inc. v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 185 F.3d 817, 820
(7th Cir. 1999); Edwards Indus., Inc. v. DE/BTE, Inc., 923 P.2d 569, 573 (Nev.
1996); Barrie-Chivian v. Lepler, 34 N.E.3d 769, 772 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015);
Wilhelm & Assocs. v. Orchards Golf Ltd. P'ship, No. 202541, 1998 WL 1988591,
at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1998).
202. 923 P.2d 569 (Nev. 1996).
203. Id. at 573 (quoting ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 498, at
683 (1950)).
204. Wilhelm & Assocs., 1998 WL 1988591, at *4.
205. Consolidation Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d at 820 (noting that a judicial
admission can take the place of a memorandum under the statute of frauds but
finding that the statements at issue did not constitute such an admission).
206. 34 N.E.3d 769 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015).
207. Id. at 772.
208. For instance, even though the Consolidation
Services, Inc. case did not involve an actual admission that was made factually,
it has been cited as standing for the proposition that the judicial admissions
exception is the law in Indiana. See, e.g., Gibson v. Arnold, 288 F.3d 1242, 1246
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not actually apply the exception to defeat a statute of frauds defense
to a claimed oral contract, they are not quite in the category of states
where the exception is firmly rooted in the law (nor did Shedd "count"
such decisions that held similarly, in his articles).209
3. States That Firmly Reject the Exception
In spite of a slowly growing number of states that have adopted
or applied the judicial admissions exception, there are a number of
states where the exception has not only not been accepted-but, in
fact, has been soundly rejected.210 In his articles, Shedd did not
highlight these decisions, perhaps because they were unremarkable
because they were simply reiterating the then-dominant majority
rule. However, some of the decisions have come since the publication
of Shedd's work and the emergence of some states' support for the
exception. Therefore, because these more recent decisions disfavoring
the exception shed light on the rationale behind retaining the
longstanding majority rule and reluctance to embrace the judicial
admissions exception, they will be briefly reported and explored.
As Shedd reported in his 1984 article, a spate of decisions
through the 1970s and early 1980s came out in favor of the judicial
admissions exception, adding to an embryonic minority rule in favor
of such an exception.211 However, several decisions noted this trend
and yet resisted it. In Brown v. Gravlee Lumber Co.,212 the
Mississippi Supreme Court observed:
We see no reason to depart from the generally prevailing rule
that a party might rely on this defense despite his admission of
the existence of the contract. Any other rule would require a
party to lie in his pleadings in order to retain the protection
afforded him by the statute.213
Thus, the court was reiterating the traditional support for the rule-
to keep from giving an incentive for the defendant o commit perjury
in order to avoid being held to be bound to a contract.
In 1986, the Vermont Supreme Court added its voice to those
states resisting any attempts to reverse the longstanding majority
rule, stating in Chomicky v. Buttolph214 as follows:
(10th Cir. 2002); Stender v. BAC Home Loans Serv., LP, No. 2:12 CV 41, 2013
WL 832416, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2013).
209. See e.g., Shedd, supra note 20, at 15-16 (citing Arnett v. Lillard, 436
S.W.2d 106, 111 (Ark. 1969); Radke v. Brenon, 134 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn.
1965)).
210. See, e.g., Brown v. Gravlee Lumber Co., 341 So.2d 907, 912 (Miss. 1977).
211. See supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
212. 341 So.2d 907 (Miss. 1977).
213. Id. at 912.
214. 513 A.2d 1174 (Vt. 1986).
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[W]e do not believe that .. . an admission takes the contract
outside the Statute of Frauds .... [W]hile the writing
requirement is imposed primarily as a shield against possible
fraud,... it also "promotes deliberation, seriousness, certainty,
and shows that the act was a genuine act of volition." In short,
it helps to ensure that contracts for the sale of land or interests
therein are not entered into improvidently. Thus,.. . we [have]
expressly stated that "[o]ne may admit the sale of land by a
verbal contract, and yet defend an action for specific
performance by pleading the statute."
215
In Chomicky, the Vermont Supreme Court thus emphasized the
deliberative functions of the statute of frauds, rather than the more
traditional ground of eliminating fraudulent claims that a contract
had been formed when in fact it had not.2 1
6 In 1988, in Durham v
Harbin,217 the Alabama Supreme Court also declined to adopt the
admission noting: "We are not wholly deaf to the strong arguments
by the commentators favoring a judicial admission exception to the
Statute, and, in a proper case, might be inclined to consider whether
the legislative intent behind the Statute of Frauds favors such a
construction."218 However, the court declined to do so because it did
not find a sufficient admission made in the case.
2 19
At least two states appear constrained by statute or statutory
interpretations from adopting or applying a comprehensive judicial
admissions exception. A Georgia statute seems to provide an
admission exception. The statute states: "The specific performance of
a parol contract as to land shall be decreed if the defendant admits
the contract. ... "220 However, cases decided under this statute make
clear that it has a very limited effect. In Haire v. Cook,221 the Georgia
Supreme Court in 1976 reaffirmed a 1941 interpretation of the
statute which stated:
[M]erely because it is alleged and proved that at some time,
somewhere, the defendant orally admitted it. Even an
admission to that effect in an answer will not be a sufficient
basis for a decree of specific performance of an oral contract for
the sale of land, where the defendant duly invokes the statute
of frauds.222
Instead, in Georgia where a defendant asserts the statute of frauds,
"the admission of a contract must itself be in writing to satisfy the
215. Id. at 1175-76 (citations omitted) (Radke v. Brenon, 134 N.W.2d 887,
889-90 (Minn. 1965); quoting Rabel, supra note 46, at 178).
216. Id. at 1175.
217. 530 So.2d 208 (Ala. 1988).
218. Id. at 212 n.5.
219. Id.
220. GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-131 (2019).
221. 229 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1976).
222. West v. Vandiviere, 14 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ga. 1941).
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conditions of [the Georgia admission exception.]"223 Requiring any
"admission" to be in writing is, in reality, little different than
requiring a formal memorandum evidencing the agreement. In
Louisiana, the only civil law state in the country, unique code
provisions essentially require written contracts for real estate and
other contract categories; little room is left for parol or oral evidence
of such agreements.224
From the 1990s to the present, at least three additional states
have resisted adopting the judicial admissions exception outside the
sale of goods. In 1996, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
"[E]xcept for cases decided under the [U.C.C.] Statute of
Frauds, ... inapplicable here, our courts have consistently held that
a party's admission of the contract in a deposition or answer does not
bar that party from pleading the statute of frauds as a defense."225
Similarly, in a 2004 a Kentucky Court of Appeals stated:
[W]e note that Kentucky law recognizes only limited exceptions
to the statute of frauds. There is no 'judicial admission'
exception recognized under Kentucky law; that is, one may
admit in a court proceeding the existence of an oral contract for
the sale of land and still invoke the statute of frauds to bar the
enforcement of the oral contract.226
In 1999, the Washington Supreme Court also resisted the plea to join
the modern trend of states adopting the judicial admission
exception.227 Notably, Washington was one of the states that Shedd
223. Johnson v. Bourchier, 263 S.E.2d 157, 158 (Ga. 1980).
224. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1839, 1847 (1985) ("Louisiana law specifically
provides that if the contract is legally required to be in writing, it cannot be
proved through other means unless it 'has been destroyed, lost, or stolen.' In
other words, witness testimony or other evidence cannot establish a contract
existed if it is one of the types of contracts that must, by law, be in writing. Again,
the legislative intent was to avoid fraud and promote certainty.") Is an Unwritten
Contract Enforceable in Louisiana?, WRIGHT & GRAY L. FIRM (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://wpglawfirm.com/is-an-unwritten-contract-enforceable-in-louisianal.
225. Computer Decisions, Inc. v. Rouse Office Mgmt. of N.C., Inc., 477 S.E.2d
262, 264 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
226. Mangrum v. Davidson, No. 2002-CA-002180-MR, 2004 WL 691598, at
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2004) (citing Cornett v. Clere, 236 S.W. 1036, 1037 (Ky.
1922)).
227. Key Design, Inc. v. Moser, 983 P.2d 653, 659-61 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
In fact, the court cited Shedd and noted the lack of any large trend, per Shedd:
Key Design's claim that this court should become part of a trend by
recognizing judicial admissions has several weaknesses. The trend is
virtually non-existent. Although there was a trend toward recognition
in the 1970s, only one state adopted a broad-based exception in the
1980s. As of 1991, only twelve states and the District of Columbia had
adopted the judicial admissions doctrine.
Id. (citing Shedd, supra note 20, at 241, 243). Of course, the court may have been
more impressed with the number of states adopting the exception had it seen the
updates provided in this article, since, as this article has established, Shedd
likely underreported the number of states that had adopted or applied the judicial
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had previously counted as having adopted the exception by virtue of
an intermediate appellate court decision, but in Key Design, Inc. v.
Moser,228 the Washington Supreme Court firmly rejected the
exception:
Allowing a party to make a judicial admission while also
pleading the statute of frauds does not necessarily perpetrate a
fraud. The majority rule permits a defendant who admits the
oral contract to insist at the same time upon the statute of
frauds. The defendant is simply carrying out one of the
purposes of the statute, which is to forbid the enforcement of
verbal contracts for the sale of real property. Given that the
statute prohibits such oral contracts, it is impossible to see how
one can be bound by a contract the statute declares void. The
defendant is not perpetrating a fraud upon the court when he
exercises his legal right under the statute. The narrower issue
in the case before us presents us with analogous reasoning. The
defendant who admits to the legal description of a property
while pleading the statute of frauds carries out the purpose of
the Martin rule [requiring real estate contracts to be in writing
and contain formal legal descriptions of land], which is to
encourage parties to include such proper descriptions in their
contracts so that courts will not have to resort to extrinsic
evidence in order to find out what was in their minds. A
defendant is not perpetrating a fraud upon the court when he
honestly admits to the legal description while insisting that a
land contract without a proper description is unenforceable
under Martin.
The statute of frauds in general provides a channeling function,
as well as the evidentiary function just discussed. The formal
requirements of the statute for land contracts helps to create a
climate in which parties often regard their agreements as
tentative until there is a signed writing ....
Finally, having affirmed the rule in Martin, which seeks to
retain clarity in the formalities required for a conveyance of real
property, this court would be acting in a contrary manner by
also creating a new exception to that rule. Not adopting the
judicial admissions doctrine is consistent with our decision to
reaffirm the rule in Martin.
Accordingly, we continue to decline to adopt a judicial
admissions exception to the Martin rule requiring that
contracts for the sale of real property contain a legal description
of the property.
229
admissions exception as of the date of the Key Design decision. See supra Subpart
V.A and accompanying text.
228. 983 P.2d 653 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
229. Id. at 660-61 (citations omitted).
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As a Washington legal commentary describes the state of the judicial
admissions exception in Washington:
At one time, there was authority in Washington case law for the
'judicial admissions' doctrine, which permitted a party to avoid
the application of the Statute of Frauds by demonstrating that
the opposing party had admitted in court or during discovery
that an oral contract existed. However, that doctrine was firmly
rejected in Key Design Inc. v. Moser.230
The holding in Key Design demonstrates that there may yet be
significant resistance to further adoptions of the judicial admissions
exception. Universal adoption of the exception appears to be far from
a fait accompli. Countervailing arguments, such as the channeling
and evidentiary functions cited by the Washington Supreme Court,
can be proffered in favor of maintaining the longstanding rule
allowing admission of the contract and simultaneous assertion of the
statute of frauds.2 31
4. Summing Up Update to Shedd Research and State of
Adoption of Judicial Admissions Exception
Taking all of Shedd's prior research and adding this Article's
contributions updating that research through the present, it appears
that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted
or affirmatively applied the judicial admissions exception outside the
sale of goods. As of 1991, Professor Shedd believed that only ten
states (plus the District of Columbia) had done so.2 3 2 This Article has
demonstrated that, due to some overlooked decisions, the number of
states adopting or applying the exception as of 1991 was probably
closer to fifteen (plus the District of Columbia).233 An additional nine
states adopted or applied the exception after 1991, and one state that
Shedd had previously counted as adopting the exception-
Washington-rejected it in 1999.234 Thus, by this Article's count,
twenty-three states have presently adopted or applied the exception.
This does not count the three states that have limited holdings
upholding agreements reached and recited in open court.235 Thus,
although several more states have seemingly embraced the exception,
it has not quite yet attained even slim majority rule status. Rather,
strictly speaking, the longstanding majority rule that a defendant
230. 25 WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: CONTRACT LAw AND PRAcTICE, § 3:17
(3d ed. 2019).
231. Key Design, Inc., 983 P.2d at 660, 665 (Madsen, J., concurring).
232. Shedd, supra note 28, at 132 n.13.
233. See cases cited supra Subpart V.A.
234. See supra notes 181-98, 229 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 112-31, 140-46, 150-65, 170-98, 200-08 and
accompanying text. This article actually cites at least four such states, but one
of them (Illinois) subsequently adopted or applied the judicial exception in full
subsequent o the limited open court decision. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 24.
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may both admit the contract and also assert the statute of frauds as
a defense is still the majority rule nationwide, if only by a thin
margin.236
If one were to add the half-dozen or so states that have voiced
support for the exception, but yet not factually been in a position to
adopt or apply it, then the picture of adoption looks brighter. But, on
the other hand, eight states have fairly recent decisions or statutes
firmly rejecting the doctrine, and instead have held to the
longstanding majority rule designed to prevent giving the defendant
an incentive to commit perjury.237 Finally, not mentioned until this
point is the fact that eleven states do not seem to have any decisions
or statutes taking a position on the judicial admissions exception
outside the applicable U.C.C. statute of frauds provisions.238 Thus,
the state of the exception seems to be that it has advanced some since
Professor Shedd's findings-even more than he had thought as of his
reported findings-but has still not quite achieved the status of even
a majority rule, let alone universal adoption. Although Professor
Shedd might have been glad to see some progress, he and many others
would surely be surprised and disappointed the exception has not
been much more predominantly embraced.
VI. TOWARDS THE UNIVERSAL ADOPTION OF THE EXCEPTION: POLICY
JUSTIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Article posits that the judicial admissions exception makes
eminent sense and should clearly be the uniformly applicable law in
every American jurisdiction. This Part will briefly discuss the policy
grounds supporting the exception. It will then discuss the historical
and suggested subsequent means for implementing the exception in
236. See supra notes 181-231 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 210-30 and accompanying text.
238. The states where no cases or statutes were found are: Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, and Wisconsin. Of these, only one case seems to directly mention the
exception at all. See Orthomet, Inc. v. A.B. Med., Inc., 990 F.2d 387, 391 (8th Cir.
1993) ("Florida case law addresses the judicial admission exception only within
the context of Article 2 of the [U.C.C.]."). A Texas case seems at first glance to
give some support for the rule, but it was a case regarding a guarantee on a
negotiable instrument, or "formal contract." See Menendez v. Tex. Comm. Bank,
McAllen, N.A., 730 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("When ... one judicially
admits that he signed an instrument in the capacity of guarantor, no other
evidence of the guaranty is required."). However, strictly speaking, the statute
of frauds does not apply in the context of negotiable instrument guarantors, or
"accommodation parties." See U.C.C. § 3-419(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1977) ("The obligation of an accommodation party may be enforced
notwithstanding any statute of frauds and whether or not the accommodation
party receives consideration for the accommodation."); see also MURRAY, supra
note 1, § 12.6 ("The statute of frauds is applicable only to informal contracts.
Among those to which it is not applicable are contracts under seal, recognizances,
and negotiable instruments.") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 120
(AM. LAw INST. 1981)).
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all jurisdictions throughout the country, given the current pace of
adoptions to date. A brief conclusion follows.
A. Policy Soundness of the Judicial Admissions Exception
Recall that the original, primary purpose of the statute of frauds
is to prevent the fraudulent assertion that a contract has been
formed-the original English Act in 1677 was literally titled an "Act
for the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries."239 That is, the titular
purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent fraud.240 England at the
time of the Act's promulgation had seen an increase in perjured
claims once oral contracts were allowed to be enforced in English
courts.241 Professor Stevens stated that fraud prevention was the
"undeniable" purpose of the statute of frauds.242 Professors Calamari
and Perillo stated that the purpose of the statute of frauds is "in large
part to obviate perjury. ... "243 Commentators invariably agree that
the prevention of fraud is the predominant purpose for the writing
requirement.244 Of course, the evil sought to be prevented is that a
court would wrongly enforce a non-existent contract against an
unwitting victim who never entered into it, based on someone's
fraudulent assertion that such a contract exists.245 Such a result is
obviously at cross-purposes with the cause of justice.
Since the primary purpose of the statute of frauds is to ensure
that no fraud is committed in establishing the existence of a contract,
recognizing the judicial admissions exception completely vindicates
that purpose. There is no danger of a fraudulent assertion of the
existence of a contract between the parties, when the defendant
admits that a contract was formed. In that case, fraud is completely
absent. In the words of one of the early English cases recognizing the
judicial admissions exception, once a defendant admits or confesses
the contract, "there can be no danger of perjury from contrariety of
evidence, which was the only mischief that statute intended to
obviate."246 On this side of the Atlantic, it is much the same, as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that if the defendant
239. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1 (citing 29 Car. 2 c. 3, 8 Stat.
at Large 405).
240. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 359.
241. Albert Roland Kiralfy et al., Common Law, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/common-law/The-16th-century-revolution
#ref40233 (last visited July 30, 2020).
242. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 360.
243. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1.
244. See, e.g., LORD, supra note 2, § 21:1 ("The statute of frauds was designed
to prevent the enforcement of unfounded fraudulent claims by requiring written
evidence."); MURRAY, supra note 1, § 12.1 ("The purpose of [the statute of frauds]
was to prevent plaintiffs from foisting certain kinds of obligations upon those who
had never assented to assume them.").
245. Stevens, supra note 21, at 360.
246. Id. at 362 (quoting Symondson v. Tweed, (1733) Precedents in Chancery
374) (emphasis added).
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judicially admits the contract, "the purpose of the statute of frauds is
served and the oral agreement will be enforced by the court."
247 The
point is so obvious that, in 1951 when Professor Stevens observed the
fall of the judicial admissions exception in England and the United
States, he exclaimed that it was "astonishing" that the rule had not
been "universally perpetuated," given that the presence of a judicial
admission was a "most convincing" basis for enforcement, and "one
with no attendant risk of perjured proof of a non-existent contract."
248
In short, a judicial admission of the contract completely eliminates
the concern of any fraud, satisfies the original purpose of the statute
of frauds, and thus should universally serve as the basis for allowing
enforcement of the contract.
Are there other possible policy goals of the statute of frauds,
beyond the paramount goal of preventing fraud in the assertion of a
contract? As discussed previously, some goals have been proffered for
the statute in its present form and usage. One goal is a channeling
function, whereby certain contracts are funneled towards being
evidenced by a writing.249 Certainty is another suggested goal.
250 It
is also suggested that "the required formality of a writing 'promotes
deliberation, seriousness ... and shows that the act was a genuine
act of volition."'
251
However, as laudable as these additional goals may be, it is
doubtful they share the same prominence as the titular, original goal
of the prevention of fraud and perjury. In addition to the historical
observations of commentators noted above, an additional significant
indicator that this is so lies in the reality and operation of other
recognized exceptions to the statute of frauds. One of the earliest
such exceptions (along with judicial admissions) is the part-
performance exception to the real estate statute of frauds.
25 2 Under
this well-established exception, most jurisdictions hold that if a buyer
performs some combination of payment, possession, and/or
improvements, the contract is enforceable even without a writing.
253
Such behavior is taken to provide good alternative proof of the
247. See Shedd, supra note 20, at 12 (citing Zlotziver v. Zlotziver, 49 A.2d 779,
781 (Pa. 1946)) (emphasis added).
248. Stevens, supra note 21, at 381.
249. Id. at 360; see also Key Design, Inc. v. Moser, 983 P.2d 653, 660-61
(Wash. 1999) ("The statute of frauds in general provides a channeling function,
as well as the evidentiary function just discussed. The formal requirements of
the statute for land contracts helps to create a climate in which parties often
regard their agreements as tentative until there is a signed writing.") (citations
omitted).
250. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.1 ("While the writing
requirement was imposed in large part to obviate perjury, it is clear that other
policy bases for the requirement exist.").
251. Rabel, supra note 46.
252. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.15.
253. Id.
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existence of the contract.254 If the other proffered goals- particularly
channeling and deliberation-were on equal footing with the utmost
goal of fraud prevention, the presence of part-performance would not
be enough to dictate enforcement because those goals would not be
vindicated by the part-performance. And yet, the part performance
exception is unquestionably the dominant majority rule.255
Similarly, the "main purpose" exception to the guaranty statute
of frauds allows enforcement of an oral guarantee promise, so long as
it is determined that the promisor's primary purpose was to benefit
his own economic interests, rather than that of the party
accommodated (as is more typical with guaranty arrangements).256
This circumstance is deemed probative that the guaranty contract
really existed.257 Again, this vindicates the fraud purposes of the
statute, but not the supposed channeling and deliberation purposes.
And yet, the vindication of the fraud purposes appears to be
determinative in the operation of these exceptions, demonstrating its
greater importance. That is, the exceptions work like this-taking
care of the fraud concern satisfies the court and allows enforcement,
even though the channeling and deliberative policy goals have not
been satisfied by the existence of a formal, executed writing. These
goals must, therefore, be seen as secondary or ancillary in comparison
to the original, titular goal of the statute of frauds. Preventing the
fraudulent assertion of an oral contract is paramount.
Further indication that the other purposes for the statute of
frauds are lesser in their importance comes by way of a study that
Professor Farnsworth made as part of the New York Law Revision
Commission in 1960 as initial passage of the U.C.C. was being
considered. With regard to the purposes of the statute of frauds,
Farnsworth observed that "[t]hree possible functions are commonly
suggested: (1) a cautionary, (2) a channeling, and (3) an evidentiary
function."258 At least with respect to the sale of goods context,
Farnsworth found that the evidentiary, or fraud prevention, purpose
of the statute of frauds remains paramount: "[T]he justification of a
Statute of Frauds as to the sale of goods must be today, just as it was
in the time of its origin in 1677, its evidentiary function, the
prevention of fraudulent claims."259 Farnsworth further rejected the
254. David G. Epstein et al., Reliance on Oral Promises: Statute of Frauds and
Promissory Estoppel, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 913, 931 (2010).
255. See H.R. Wilhoit, The Statute of Frauds and Part Performance of Land
Contracts in Kentucky, 22 KY. L.J. 434, 435 (1934).
256. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 34, § 19.6.
257. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
258. Philip K. Yonge, The Unheralded Demise Of The Statute Of Frauds
Welsher In Oral Contracts For The Sale Of Goods And Investment Securities: Oral
Sales Contracts Are Enforceable By Involuntary Admissions In Court Under
U. C. C. Sections 2-201(3)(b) And 8-319(d), 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 9 n.38 (1976)
(citing STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE LAw REVISION COMMISSION 259-260 (1960)).
259. Id. at 9.
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cautionary/deliberation function as "insignificant," compared to the
paramount evidentiary/fraud prevention function.
260
Further to be conversely considered is the insufficient
justification for the longstanding majority rule, that denies the
judicial admission exception and rather provides that a defendant
may admit the contract and yet still assert the statute of frauds as a
defense.261 One justification for such a rule by modern courts clinging
to it is, in fact, the channeling function just described.
26 2 But, as
discussed above, this justification should be considered of lesser
importance than the titular goal of preventing fraudulent assertions
of contract. But, of course, the more longstanding, traditional reason
for the majority rule is to remove the incentive for the defendant to
commit perjury by falsely stating he did not enter into a contract,
when in fact he did.263 Rather, operation of the rule lets the party
admit the contract truthfully, and then assert the statute of frauds as
a defense-vindicating, apparently, not just the appreciation for
defendant's truthful testimony, but also the secondary deliberation
and channeling functions.264
For one, this highlights that the longstanding majority rule,
denying the judicial admissions exception, completely turned the
statute of frauds on its head in terms of original policy justifications.
The rule discards the primary anti-fraud/evidentiary purposes of the
rule, since it denies enforcement of the contract even though the
defendant has admitted its existence is not being fraudulently
asserted to be true, but rather is really true-that is, the original
concern of the statute of frauds has been satisfied and yet, defendant's
assertion of the defense is allowed to nevertheless remain.
265 In
furtherance of what policies? As Professor Corbin stated in his
important Contracts treatise, "[ilt is far from carrying out the true
purpose for which the statute exists to permit its invocation by one who
admits the contract."266 In the words of Professor Stevens, "the
statute was intended to be used as a shield, not a sword."
267 The goal
of perjury prevention has always been dubious. The theory of this
supposed legislative intent, Stevens noted, did not emerge until over
a century after the passage of the original statute of frauds.
268
260. Id. I do not wish to overstate the Farnsworth report, or take it too much
out of its sale of goods context. In fact, Farnsworth was careful to mention that
the channeling function might be more important for real estate contracts than
for sale of goods contracts. Id. at 9 n.38. But he undoubtedly stated that the
evidentiary function was the most important.
261. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 361.
262. Key Design, Inc. v. Moser, 983 P.2d 653, 660 (Wash. 1999).
263. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
264. See id.
265. Stevens, supra note 21, at 360.
266. MURRAY, supra note 1, § 14.2 (emphasis added).
267. Stevens, supra note 21, at 360.
268. Id.
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Moreover, there is nothing terribly unique in oral contracts cases
about the defendant's incentive to commit perjury in order to refrain
from admitting certain facts which may hurt his case. This is true in
all litigation. If I was looking at my smartphone while I was driving
and hit a pedestrian committing negligence, I have an incentive to lie
and say my phone was in my pocket. All witnesses take an oath to
give honest, truthful testimony.26 9 The incentive not to commit
perjury, aside from any moral incentives, is criminal peril.270 The
reasons for giving a defendant in a contracts case the additional
benefit of the longstanding majority rule are far from persuasive. As
Professor Stevens remarked in 1951, it is simply "astonishing that the
removal of the temptation to the defendant to perjure himself by
denying the making of an agreement should have been employed as a
device for permitting him unethically to escape an honest
obligation."27 1 The longstanding majority rule should, therefore, be
discarded, and a judicial admissions exception implemented in all
jurisdictions.
B. Caselaw Adoption and Alternative Legislation
The adoption of the judicial admissions exception outside the sale
of goods context (governed by U.C.C. section 2-201), with a few
exceptions,272 has been by case law holdings. And, as noted by
Professor Shedd-and further observed by this Article-such
adoption has been exceedingly gradual.273 After the establishment of
the longstanding majority rule denying the exception, only four
jurisdictions had adopted the exception before the 1970s.274
Subsequent to these initial four, the pattern has been as follows (not
counting the District of Columbia): (1) two states adopted it in the
1970s (originally three but one, Washington, later retracted);275 (2)
eight states adopted it in the 1980s (three, including the District of
Columbia, according to Shedd,276 and another five found by this
Article); 277 (3) seven states adopted or applied the exception in the
1990s;278 and (4) two states have so far adopted or applied the
269. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 603 ("Before testifying, a witness must give an
oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress
that duty on the witness's conscience.").
270. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018) (stating that under federal law, perjury
is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison).
271. Stevens, supra note 21, at 381.
272. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(b)(3)(C)
(2015); IOWA CODE § 622.34 (2013); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-701(b)(3)(c) (2002).
273. Shedd, supra note 28, at 133.
274. See supra Subpart IV.A.1 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
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exception in 2000 and beyond.279 The rate of adoption or application
appears to have peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, and has since slowed
to a crawl.
Common law develops, as it always has, by a slow and steady
reaction of courts to the cases that are before them. "The persistent
movement of the common law towards satisfying the needs of the
times is soundly marked by gradualness. Its step by step process
affords the light of continual experience to guide its future course."
280
Sometimes, in fact, the resistance of courts to form new precedent in
the name of stare decisis can lead to odd gyrations in order to seem
as though such precedent is adhered to. For instance, in the
Minnesota Supreme Court case of Radke v. Brenon,281 a litigant's oral
assent to the contract was admitted.282 The court, however, was
apparently loathe to appear as though it was abandoning the
longstanding majority rule that a defendant could both admit the
contract and still assert the statute of frauds.283 Instead, the court
decided to find a writing, that was of somewhat doubtful sufficiency
under the statute, as fully complying with the requisites of the
applicable statute of frauds, given the defendant's admission:
"Although we have followed the majority rule that admission of the
contract does not preclude assertion of the statute of frauds, an
admission that a contract was made certainly cannot be ignored when
all other evidence submitted supports the same conclusion."
284
It may be that we will just have to be content to wait for the
judicial admissions exception to develop, gradually, during the course
of decisions in the remaining jurisdictions that have not adopted or
applied it. Such has happened over and over in the course of the
development of the common law. But litigants would benefit from the
courts' clear adoption of the judicial admissions exception, for the
policy reasons outlined above. Stare decisis is a hallowed principle of
the common law, but a rule must not outlive its usefulness or
sensibility, especially when, as in the case of the longstanding
majority rule here, it was of dubious justification to begin with.
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.285
279. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
280. Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc., 170 A.2d 791, 799 (N.J. 1961)
(emphasis added).
281. 134 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. 1965).
282. Id. at 889.
283. Id. at 891-92.
284. Id. at 891.
285. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457,
469 (1897).
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The longstanding majority rule is such a revolting rule, and an
"astonishing" one-one that should be discarded entirely.286
The courts have a persuasive authority ready at their disposal in
deciding to adopt a judicial admissions exception-the U.C.C. The
U.C.C. statute of frauds, section 2-201, contains a statutory judicial
admissions exception.2 87 Although Article 2 only applies to contracts
for the sale of goods or other "transactions in goods",288 it can be
applied persuasively to contracts outside that context.289 Moreover,
since there are at least two different statutes of frauds in all
jurisdictions, there is some justification for applying them
consistently-that is,
[b]ecause statutes on the same subject are in pari materia and
are to be construed to achieve consistent results whenever
possible,... the general statute of frauds and the U.C.C.
statute of frauds should be construed in similar ways to the
extent possible. Thus, if possible, the general statute of frauds
should be interpreted to include a judicial-admission exception
since the U.C.C. statute of frauds has one.290
In the states where the courts have not yet acted, and especially
in the states where the courts have firmly rejected the doctrine, a
different tactic may be warranted. In these states, there is a more
direct solution-legislation. Since the statute of frauds is, of course,
generally a statutory provision, promulgating the judicial admissions
exception directly in the statutory provisions makes eminent sense,
and would avoid the delay of waiting years, maybe decades, for a court
to adopt the exception in a litigated case. As noted above, the U.C.C.
statute of frauds provision has the judicial admissions exception
included in the statute (along with several others).291 A few states-
Iowa, Alaska, New York, and California-have already amended
their statute of frauds provisions to include express statutory judicial
admissions exceptions.292 For the policy reasons discussed, non-
adopting states would do well to follow their lead.
286. Stevens, supra note 21, at 381.
287. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1977).
288. Id. § 2-102.
289. See, e.g., Stoetzel v. Cont'l Textile Corp. of Am., 768 F.2d 217, 222 (8th
Cir. 1985) ("We note, moreover, that the judicial admission theory as a basis for
removing an oral contract from the Statute of Frauds has been recognized by the
Missouri legislature, albeit in a different context: in sales of goods under the
U.C.C., the legislature has specifically excluded from the operation of the sales
article's Statute of Frauds contracts admitted by the party to be charged in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
290. In re Marriage of Takusagawa, 166 P.3d 440, 447 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007)
(citing Newman Mem. Hosp. v. Walton Constr. Co., 149 P.3d 525, 542 (Kan. App.
2007)) (citations omitted).
291. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
292. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020 (1962); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624(b)(3)(C) (2015);
IOWA CODE § 622.34 (2013); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-701(b)(3)(c) (2002).
522 [Vol. 55
STATUTE OF FRAUDS EXCEPTION
VII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the statute of frauds is primarily to avoid the
fraudulent assertion of a contract by requiring a writing to evidence
the contract in certain cases.293 However, when a party judicially
admits the existence of the contract, the evidentiary need for the
writing is eliminated, and the titular purpose of the statute of frauds
is vindicated.294 Although the judicial admissions exception was at
one point commonly accepted, it fell out of favor and instead the
longstanding majority rule became that one could admit the contract
and yet still assert the statute of frauds.2
95 This rule was, as
Professor Stevens has noted, an "astonishing" development and a
complete abandonment of the original purpose of the statute.
296 It
has been heartening, therefore, for jurisdictions to begin adopting the
judicial admissions exception again, as well as for the U.C.C. to adopt
it expressly in the context of Article 2 governing the sale of goods.
However, as Professor Shedd observed, and as this Article has
highlighted and traced to the present, such adoption has proceeded at
a slow pace. It is hoped that courts in non-adopting states will
proceed to adopt the exception at their earliest opportunity. Absent
that, the state legislatures should act to adopt the exception. The
policies of the statute of frauds, and the interests of justice, would be
furthered by the adoption of the exception and recognition and
enforcement of contracts that have been plainly admitted.
293. See supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.
296. Stevens, supra note 21, at 381.
5232020]
